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ABSTRACT

SECURITY AND FOEIGN POLICY OF LANDLOCKED STATES

August 2016

Samiullah Mahdi, B.A., Kabul University
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Professor Luis Jimenez

Wealth and stability of the region have direct influence on the foreign policy and
security of landlocked states. Landlocked states residing in poor and unstable
neighborhoods, consequently, experience instability and have more limited foreign
policy options compared to those landlocked states which are located in the rich and
stable regions of the world. Besides those, two other factors, nationalism and the
nature of export product, extensively influence foreign policy and security of some
landlocked countries. However, they are exceptions to the rule. Wealth and stability
of the neighborhood determine the direction and fate of landlocked countries foreign
policies and security measures.
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Abstract. Wealth and stability of the region have a direct influence on the foreign policy
and security of landlocked states. Landlocked states residing in poor and unstable
neighborhoods, consequently, experience instability and have more limited foreign policy
options compared to those landlocked states which are located in the rich and stable
regions of the world. Besides those, two other factors, nationalism and the nature of
export product, extensively influence foreign policy and security of some landlocked
countries. However, they are exceptions to the rule. Wealth and stability of the
neighborhood determine the direction and fate of landlocked countries foreign policies
and security measures.
Key words: Landlocked states, foreign policy, security, power relation, wealth,
stability
Security and Foreign Policy of Landlocked States
PART I
INTRODUCTION
To what extent does landlocked-ness matter for a country’s security? To
what extent does being landlocked shapes a country’s foreign policy? This thesis uses
two factors commonly cited in the literature—regional stability and wealth—as
independent variables to explore the ways in which these types of geographical contexts
expand or constrain options for landlocked countries. It further analyzes how countries
react to their environment and how, in turn, this leads to the development of strategies to
diminish or curb any potential geographical disadvantages. In another words, this thesis
aims to answer how wealth and stability of the region interact with foreign policy and
security of landlocked states,
Besides wealth and stability, there are two other factors, nature of the main
export product and nationalism, which to some extent determine landlocked countries’
foreign and security policies towards their maritime neighbors and the whole region.

1

Answering these questions is important because landlocked-ness appears
to be correlated with insecurity and lack of development. Currently, twenty of 54 lowincome countries are landlocked and sixteen of these landlocked states are categorized as
least developed countries which also suffer from insecurity (Chowdhury and Erdenebileg,
2006, 4). Of course, there are landlocked countries like Switzerland and Austria which
suffer no real security problems and are high-income economies. Nonetheless, they tend
to be the exceptions. Countries like Rwanda, Mali, Afghanistan, and Armenia, all
landlocked, have faced lasting conflicts and insecurity which have played a role in severe
security conditions of their respective regions. Lack of access to the sea places
landlocked states in an inferior power relationship vis-à-vis their maritime neighbors (de
Blij and Glassner, 1989, 389) for a number of reasons. First, it can make them dependent
economically if trade in a country rests on the whim or capacity of its neighbors. Second,
potential attacks, invasions or military turmoil in a maritime country disproportionately
affect its landlocked neighbors because security alternatives are further reduced and their
economic impacts are more pronounced.
Insular states are intrinsically more secure than continental or landlocked states
(Mearsheimer, 2001, 25). Mearsheimer argues that "large bodies of water profoundly
limit the power-projection capabilities of land forces" (Mearsheimer, 2001, 41) because it
reduces the offensive capability of the opponent force by creating a natural defensive
barrier for the country surrounded by large body of water. Emphasizing on the
importance of land power and the stopping power of water, Mearsheimer believes that
Sea-Power and Air-power do not determine the faith of wars, "Wars are won by big
battalions, not by armadas in the air or on the sea. The strongest power is the state with
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the strongest army" (Mearsheimer, 2001, 42). This argument shows another aspect in the
security vulnerability of landlocked states. Thus, landlocked countries are weaker
compared to their maritime counterparts and have fewer options when setting their
foreign policies. The level of dependency on their transit neighbors, however, varies from
one region to another.
The literature on the subject has posited two key variables behind potential
variance across cases: stability and wealth. This is because landlocked countries that
reside in neighborhoods that combine both of those characteristics, such as Switzerland,
Austria, and Luxemburg, also tend to be stable and wealthy. In part, because there seems
to be a spillover effect, and in part because richer neighborhoods are less likely to have
conflict, or at least less likely to resolve their disputes via invasions or war. Therefore,
the existing literature suggests that landlocked countries’ foreign policies have three main
characteristics: special policies towards the transit states (including concession towards
the maritime neighbors), multi-directional foreign policies, “which entails refraining from
joining exclusive alliance systems and maintaining cooperation with competing alliance
systems” (Idan and Shaffer, 2001, 243) and promoting the transportation issue to the
level of a priority in foreign policy (Mishra and Sing, 2008). The question which needs to
be addressed here is whether this is the case for all landlocked countries? or whether
there are some regional effects? If it varies, what are the variables in the regions that
account for the foreign and security policies of landlocked countries in different regions?
As mentioned above, the location of a country matters in the power
relation between a state and its neighbors, in most cases, putting landlocked countries in
the inferior position. What are the causes of their insecurity? Which foreign policy
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approaches make them stable and which policies cause instability? Answer to these
questions may lead to solutions which would not only help the security of the landlocked
countries but might also suggest policy adjustments that could help regional and global
security.
In order to answer these questions, this thesis takes into consideration two
main variables: stability and wealth of the region. These two variables divide all regions
where the landlocked countries are located in four different categories: rich and stable,
rich but instable, poor and stable, and finally poor and instable. Six countries from
different regions are picked as measures for above four categories. The case studies are
Switzerland as a representative of rich and stable regions, Armenia representing a
relatively rich but instable region, Bolivia and Botswana examples from somewhat poor
but stable regions, and finally. Afghanistan and Uzbekistan representing poor and instable
regions.
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PART II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Out of 42 landlocked countries, 32 are categorized as landlocked
developing countries (LLDCs) and 16 of these are those with the least Human
Development Achievement (Chowdhury and Erdenebileg, 2006, 4). Given these
parameters, the existing body of scholarship on landlocked countries focuses mostly on
the economic aspects regarding the relationship of landlocked countries with their
maritime neighbors. In particular, the literature emphasizes the dependence of the former
on the latter. This rich literature, however, ignores almost completely any aspect related
to the foreign policy regarding their security of the countries in question. For instance, it
is not clear that how landlocked countries respond to the regional factors which put
constrains on their foreign policy and national security.
According to the existing literature, landlocked countries’ dependency on
their maritime neighbors, rests in four important areas: transportation infrastructure,
stability, administrative procedures, and cross-border political relations. These factors
make LLCs’ dependency multi-dimensional. Based on the UNDP 2002 report, 9 out of 12
countries with lowest scores in Human Development are landlocked and no landlocked
country, with the exception of European LLCs, is listed as ‘high human development’
(Faye, Macarthur, Sachs, Snow, 32, 2004).
Regarding development and economy, the current literature on landlocked
countries stresses on the importance of the specific location in which a landlocked
country is placed in. In other words, a landlocked country’s neighborhood determines its
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fortune in development because the countries in question are dependent on the transit
routes of their maritime neighbors to access the international markets, use their
infrastructure, and go through their costume and tariff processes (Chowdhury and
Erdenebileg, 2006, 5). Thus, these factors make the neighborhood an important element
in the growth of the landlocked countries. To illustrate this point, wealth and stability of
the transit country have a direct effect on the level of transactions a landlocked country
encounters with the international markets. Even if the transit country is wealthy and
stable, the landlocked countries need to maintain a friendly relationship towards their
maritime neighbors to win their goodwill. Thus, landlocked countries’ need for their
maritime neighbors’ cooperation, forces landlocked countries to follow an especial
foreign policy and show concession towards their maritime or transit neighbors (Idan and
Shaffer, 2001).
The common theme in the development literature is the importance of
landlocked countries’ neighborhood. For instance, Dunne suggests that if Switzerland is a
landlocked but a wealthy country, it is because the country is surrounded by a wealthy
and stable neighborhood which has a thriving economy with modern infrastructures. In
contrast, this is not the case for the landlocked countries which are surrounded by
neighbors who have poor transportation system and in some cases suffering from
insecurity (Dunne, 2014, 2). Hence, landlocked countries are not just affected by being
dependent on their neighbors’ transit routes, but also upon their security and
infrastructure.
To overcome the landlocked status, there are three different practices that
landlocked countries could adopt to secure access to the sea: river navigation, corridor or
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a strip of land, and guaranteed transit lines. Navigable rivers as an alternative for
landlocked states entered the international law debates in the 18th century. Navigable
rivers were accepted as a gift by nature which shouldn’t be limited by man’s action.
Rivers such as Danube, Rhine, Amazon, Rio de La Plata, The Congo, Niger, Shat el Arab,
Mekong and many others are in this category. This right for landlocked states has been
interrupted several times by maritime states. The bloodiest war in South American
history, the Triple Alliance War in the 19th Century, for instance, had much to do with
Argentina’s and Brazil’s blocking of the Rio de la Plata to Paraguayan commerce.
Elsewhere, during World War II, Germany blocked navigation on the Danube. Although
there are some protections by international law for legal freedom of navigation, it can still
be denied easily by maritime states (Misrha and Singh, 2008, 59-61). On the other hand,
a landlocked country can benefit from this alternative only if it has navigable rivers.
Many landlocked states in Central Asia, for instance, do not have a navigable river that
empties into the open sea. Thus, navigable rivers can be an option only to a limited
number of landlocked countries which have access to such rivers.
As mentioned, corridors are another window for the landlocked states to
get access to the sea. Those landlocked states which can manage a cordial relationship
with their maritime neighbors can have sovereignty over the piece of land as a corridor to
get access to the sea. Or, states could get this alternative with coercive force. For
instance, the Russian empire in the 18th century got such accesses to the Baltic Sea and
the Black Sea by force. Landlocked states, however, due to weak state power and
permanent inferiority (de Blij and Glassner, 1989) usually lack the ability to get a
corridor by force. Another example can be Iraq which was provided a corridor in the
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Persian Gulf. However, defense and security maintenance for corridors as an alternative
is proven to be difficult (Mishra and Singh, 2008, 62). Thus, cordial relationship with the
neighboring country, who agrees to give up a portion of its soil to its landlocked
neighbor, is the prerequisite for getting access to corridors for landlocked states.
A transit facility is the third alternative a landlocked state can have. This
alternative is based on the principle that recognizes the access to the sea as a "right" for
landlocked states. International laws accepted in conferences such as Barcelona in 1921
and the U.N Conference on the law of the sea in 1958 emphasize this right. Even
assuming maritime states are willing to provide these openings to their landlocked
neighbors, transit routes can be easily closed by the transit country due to security and
political concerns. Thus, maritime neighbors can use the closure of the transit facilities as
a pressure tool against the landlocked state (Mishra and Singh, 200865). In such
situations, landlocked states have few or no foreign policy options to use as a bargaining
power against their maritime or transit neighbor. Among all these three options,
guaranteed transit by using transit facilities of the maritime neighbor has been the most
successful one so far (Glassner and Blij, 1989, 390). However, the success of granted
transit depends on the goodwill of the transit state.
Those studies which are focused on the foreign policy and national security
implications of not having access to the sea, similar to the development studies,
emphasize the importance of location and neighborhood. Literature looking at being
landlocked from a foreign policy and national security point of view suggests that
landlocked countries inherit inferior geographical position vis-à-vis their maritime
neighbors (Mishra and Singh, 2008, 55). Similar to the development literature, Mishra
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and Singh suggest that there is no direct relation between being landlocked and
insecurity. They propose that security of landlocked countries depends on the level of
power the neighboring countries maintain. For instance, if a landlocked country is located
among relatively weak states, the foreign policy of the landlocked state will not be
affected by its location. Countries such as Uzbekistan, Mali, Chad, Central African
Republic, and Uganda are in the neighborhoods of weak states. On the contrary, if a
landlocked country is located among powerful states, like Armenia between Turkey, Iran,
and Russia, they can sustain stability only if “[a country] practices proper diplomacy or
the buffer function [is] non-functional”. Countries like Switzerland, Bolivia, and
Paraguay are in this category” (Mishra and Singh, 2008, 56-57).
There are four important factors impacting landlocked states’ foreign and
security policies:1- inferior geographical location; 2- shelter belt or buffer states; 3- fewer
foreign policy options; 4- weak national power and weak bargaining power; Thus, there
are three main features of landlocked countries’ foreign policies: multi-vector strategic
orientations; special policies towards their transit states, including significant concession;
and investment in infrastructures in their port states. Although, these three features may
vary from case to case, Idan and Shafer conclude that landlocked countries’ special
policy, with concession, towards their maritime neighbors is visible in all cases (Idan and
Shafer, 2001, 243). This conclusion doesn’t explain some countries’ foreign policies
towards their transit neighbors. For instance, Afghanistan and Bolivia, as landlocked
states, do not follow concession in their foreign policies towards their closest maritime
neighbors, Pakistan in the case of Afghanistan (Hassan, 1964, 48) and Chile in the case of
Bolivia. It seems that some other factors, which are important in determining the
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landlocked countries’ foreign policies, have been underestimated in this conclusion. To
address this gap in the existing literature, cases studied in this thesis show that that factor
is aggression based on nationalism against the maritime neighbor. This issue will be
explained in more details later.
The effect of the region on LLC is the baseline for development and
foreign policy studies of landlocked countries. All cited works gave a particular
importance to the surroundings of landlocked countries. As argued above, being
surrounded by poor and unstable region is one of the main reasons of being
underdeveloped besides not having access to the sea. However, being in a neighborhood
of powerful and stable states doesn’t guarantee national strength for the landlocked
countries either. In contrary, it puts the landlocked country in a more inferior position in
relation to its maritime neighbors. The existing literature doesn’t provide an explanation
of how landlocked countries in different regions behave towards their transit countries.
Besides being landlocked, what are other regional factors that influence foreign and
security policies of landlocked states. In the existing body of scholarship landlocked
countries are considered as neutral or reactive rather than proactive in regards to their
maritime neighbors. Is that really the case?
A.

Problems associated with landlocked-ness
Here are some of the main problems associated with the landlocked status

of states such as weak defense capability and permanent inferiority, dual vulnerability,
acting as shatter belt or buffer state of the region, the high cost of transportation, and
underdevelopment.
1. Weak Defense Capability and Permanent Inferiority
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Literature looking at being landlocked from foreign policy and national
security points of view suggests that Landlocked countries inherit inferior geographical
position in relation to their maritime neighbors (Mishra and Singh, 2008, 55). No access
to the sea relegates a nation to the level of permanent inferiority. In the international
relations arena, regional and global powers’ attitudes towards LLCs make the latter
‘shelter belt’ or ‘buffer state’. These two are the only role LLCs can play in the
international relations (Mishra and Singh, 2008, 55). LLCs have no other choice but to
adopt yielding strategies towards their transit or coastal neighbors. This power relation is
visible comparing the foreign policy options of LLCs and their maritime neighbors (Idan
and Shafer, 2001, 264). Glassner believes that “boundaries” and occasionally “existence”
of landlocked states are decided by more major powers in the neighborhood (Glassner,
1970, 15). Landlocked states are considered militarily weak even in comparison to
‘middle-rank powers. Furthermore, LLCs suffer from feeble bargaining power against
their transit neighbors. Instead of power, LLCs have to use persuasive strategies towards
their maritime neighbors. Thus, LLCs are constrained to keep their coastal neighbors
happy in order to secure smooth access to the ports of the coastal neighbors (Glassner and
Blij, 1989, 388-89).
2.

Dual vulnerability
Dual venerability means that landlocked states are vulnerable to their own

landlocked status as well as on the well-being of the transit neighbors (Mishra and Sing,
2008, 56). Landlocked countries are heavily dependent on their neighbors’ infrastructure,
cross-border political relations; neighbor’s peace and stability; and administrative
procedures (Faye, McArthur, Sachs, and Snow, 2004, 31). For instance, the poor
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infrastructure of a maritime or transit neighbor affects landlocked state's trade and
prosperity because landlocked states have no choice but to transport goods through the
maritime neighbor. The same is true about political instability and severe security in the
transit neighbor. Thus, landlocked states’ prosperity is not only dependent on the stability
and good infrastructures of their own but also on the well-being of the maritime or transit
neighbor.
3.

Acting as Buffer State
Mishra and Singh argue that landlocked states cannot achieve status higher

than "shatter-belt" or "buffer state" in international relations arena. Such states have to
either remain neutral or to align with larger powers in the neighborhood to maintain
security. Otherwise, they will be annexed to the regional powers or will lose stability
(Mishra and Singh, 2008, 56). Diehl and Hansel define shatter-belt as a geographic
location which is troubled by regional and international competitions. Shatter-belt regions
are usually not within the spheres of major powers, however, more than one major power
have "equal footing" in the area competing each other's influence. Shatter-belt areas are
twice more prone to war compared to other areas of the world. Their wars are lengthier
with a higher level of severity and interstate wars are more likely to happen in the shatterbelts. Shatter-belts have three major characteristics: first, shatter-belt states are weak;
second, the regions are fragmented; and finally, extensive foreign military and economic
involvement or intervention ar visible in shatter-belt areas (Diehel, and Hensel, 1994, 2,
7, 12, 23).
Glassner (1970, 10) believes that landlocked states are in action buffer
states. Glassner, in his other work with de Blij (1989, 127, 236) argues that although
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“buffer states can benefit from the intermediary role in trade, transportation, and
communications, but are also subject to buffering from both sides”. They believe that
buffer states are “areas of weakness” and are created to form a neutralist bloc and prevent
conflict between stronger areas.
Shatter-belt effect and buffer-zone keep landlocked states under constant
pressure applied by their neighborhood and major international powers interested in the
region. These pressures push landlocked states, in the shatter-belts, to follow multi-vector
foreign policies.
4.

High Cost of Transport
Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), compared to other developing

countries, pay two times more for securing services for their exports. The amount that
landlocked developing countries spend on export services is almost three times higher
than any given developed country. This problem reduces landlocked countries' chance for
competition in the international markets (UN-OHRLLS, 2015). United Nations’
Secretary-General’s report on landlocked developing countries for the U.N. 2015 General
Assembly indicates that: Owing to their long distances from the sea, LLDCs face
disproportionately high transport and transaction costs, which intensify their comparative
disadvantages relative to other developing countries”. LLDCs, on average, spend 40 days
to export, while maritime developing countries spend only 22 days. LLDCs in 2014 paid
$3,443 for import and $4,343 for export compared to maritime developing countries who
pay $1,301 for import and $1,559 for export (UN Secretary General Report, 2015, 2).
Collier (2006) believes that the amount a landlocked country pays for
transportation costs depends on how sophisticated its maritime neighbor's transport
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infrastructure is and thus landlocked countries are hostages to their neighbors. He
attributes Switzerland’s development to the neighborhood it is surrounded by and
Uganda’s underdevelopment to being dependent upon the transportation routes of Kenya,
an underdeveloped neighbor. While Germany and Italy not only provide modern
transportation routes for Switzerland but also supply their markets, Kenya doesn’t
provide a reliable transportation infrastructure and at the same time, it doesn’t have a
thriving market which Uganda could benefit exporting to (Collier, 2006, 55).
Some scholars have argued that distance by itself cannot explain why
landlocked countries are poorer than inland parts of countries like China or Russia. They
believe that besides distance, the cross-border issues and passing through another
sovereign nation’s soil is considered a key blocking factor for the prosperity of
landlocked countries (Faye, McArthur, Sachs, Snow, 2004, 32). Thus, the neighborhood
determines the price a landlocked country should pay for trade and transport. If a
landlocked country is located in a thriving neighborhood, like Western Europe, it not only
will have the opportunity to use its neighbors’ infrastructure to export goods through
them but also to trade with them. Therefore, in the case of poor neighborhoods,
landlocked country is a hostage of underdevelopment of its transit or maritime neighbors.
5.

Underdevelopment
Historical observation of Adam Smith in 1776 showed that "inland" parts

of Africa and Asia were the least developed regions of the world at that time. Smith
attributed this problem to the remoteness and geographical barriers for trade (Faye,
McArthur, Sachs, and Snow, 2004, 32). Over two centuries later, destiny for landlocked
states is not much changed. Landlocked developing countries are among the poorest in
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the world. From 31 landlocked developing countries, 16 are among least developed
countries of the world. Only European landlocked countries are considered as developed
economies. While most of the non-European landlocked countries are located in poor
regions of the world, European landlocked countries are located in rich neighborhoods
with which they do a major part of their trade and seaborne trade account for a small
portion of their export incomes (UN-OHRLLS, 2015). According to UN-OHRLLS report
dependency on very few commodities for export and distance from world markets are
among the reasons of landlocked countries under-development.
Landlocked countries are among the poorest countries in the world and 3
out of 5 poorest countries are landlocked. The average GDP per capita of landlocked
countries is 32 percent of the global average and $1,700 lower than transit developing
countries (UN Secretary General Report, 2015, 3). Collier suggests that 38 percent of
people living in the bottom-billion are from landlocked developing countries (Collier,
2006, 54).
The level of emphasizing the importance of location is equally visible in
Adam Smith (1776) and UN-OHRLLS argument about the underdevelopment of
landlocked countries of certain regions of the world. Thus, it can be argued that while
landlocked countries are generally underdeveloped compared to their maritime neighbors,
location can exacerbate the geographical handicap of these countries. This is true of all
non-European landlocked countries compared to their European counterparts.
B. Variation across states
All landlocked countries face the previously mentioned shortcomings to
some extent, but not all respond to it in the same way, which in turn mitigates some of
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these problems. To what extent does that happen because of the regional context they are
interacting with? Looking at the cases studied in this thesis reveals that not all landlocked
countries are responding to these inadequacies in the same way. The first variation is the
level of development of the region which can be translated as the level of wealth of the
region. There is a big difference between landlocked countries located in the poor and
underdeveloped regions and those which are located in the rich and developed regions.
All European landlocked countries are examples for this argument.
The second variation across countries and regions is the stability of the
region wherein a landlocked country is located. Armenia can be a good instance of a
country which is not suffering from internal instability, however, it suffers from
instability in the region. Armenia is dependent on two major routes: Georgia and Iran.
While Iranian route is more stable, Georgian route is not very much reliable due to the
enmity between Russia and Georgia. The Georgian-Russian War in 2008 fully cut
Armenia’s access to the Russian market and transportation system. Uzbekistan has a
similar fate. Although the most cost efficient way for Uzbekistan to export goods to the
European markets is through Afghanistan, instability in Afghanistan, however, deprives
Uzbekistan from this luxury.
Afghanistan itself is an example of being the victim of domestic and
regional instability. Afghanistan is not only affected by its own ongoing lack of stability
but also by instability in the neighborhood. Afghanistan uses three main routes for
international imports and exports: Pakistan, Iran, and Post-Soviet Central Asian countries.
Country’s main export route, however, is Pakistan. International Security Assistance
Forces (ISAF) and American troops used the Pakistani route for sending military supplies
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to Afghanistan. This route has been closed several times due to the high level of
insecurity in the Pakistani soil (Monish, 2012, 3).
The third variation is the nature of a landlocked country’s exporting
goods. The nature of export determines the level of landlocked country’s dependence on
its neighbors and the entire region. For instance, Botswana is located in a relatively poor
neighborhood, nonetheless, it has a thriving economy and is an exception among all nonEuropean landlocked countries which has secured upper-middle income economy status.
Most scholars and international organizations attribute Botswana’s success to the
country’s diamond industry. Because of the nature of its export, diamond, which is light
in weight and precious in price, it can be exported by air transportation. Thus, Botswana
is able to avoid the underdeveloped infrastructure of most of its neighbors and not to pay
high transportation costs. However, Botswana is an exception among landlocked
countries and thus, the nature of export cannot be considered as a determining factor for
other landlocked countries.
On the contrary, countries exporting agricultural products such as cotton,
in the case of Uzbekistan, and natural resources such gas and oil, in the case of Bolivia,
cannot avoid their neighborhood transportation facilities. Uzbekistan, a doubly
landlocked country, has to use railways or roads of its neighbors for exporting cotton.
While the route to the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan is the closest port for
Uzbekistan, it cannot use it due to Afghanistan’s underdeveloped infrastructure and longlasting conflict. Uzbekistan has to use Kazakhstan routes which are costlier due to the
distance. Bolivia, to some extent, faces the same problem as Uzbekistan. While the
country’s main export is natural gas, it cannot export gas to Northern America or Europe
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through the closest port in Chile. It has to export its precious product to the neighboring
countries with a cheaper price.
And the fourth variation which influences foreign policies and security policies of
most landlocked countries studied in this thesis is nationalism. Foreign policies and
security measures of countries such as Bolivia, Armenia, and Afghanistan are affected by
a high tendency of nationalism against their certain maritime neighbors. Although these
tendencies root back in the history, these countries are still affected by it. Armenia’s
hostile relations with Turkey is based on the historical dispute over the mass killing of
Armenian ethnics during the World War I by Ottoman military. Armenia’s international
quest for recognition of 1915 mass killings as genocide continues to be the main reason
for its belligerent relations with Turkey. Bolivia has a similar attitude towards Chile due
to a historical dispute over losing its coastline in the war of Pacific during 1879–1883.
Similarly, Afghanistan’s dispute with Pakistan over the lands beyond the Durand line,
which was signed between Afghanistan’s King and British Empire in 1893, is one of the
reasons behind aggressive relations between these two neighbors depriving Afghanistan
from a stable access to the closest ports in Pakistan.
In contrast to these three cases (Bolivia, Armenia, and Afghanistan),
Uzbekistan has chosen a different path for its foreign policy towards its main transit
neighbor, Kazakhstan. Although it had historical territorial dispute with all its Central
Asian neighbors, Uzbekistan resolved its disputes with Kazakhstan with showing
enormous concession. This is mainly due to Uzbekistan leadership’s early understanding
and recognition of the importance of Kazakh transportation route for the country’s
economic development.
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While stability and wealth of the region are two main determining factors
of the wellbeing and foreign and security policies of almost all landlocked countries,
nature of exporting product and nationalism can also be counted as important factors in
some cases. However, in the wealthier and stable regions nationalism and the nature of
product do not seem to be a problem to the extent which prevents a cordial relation with
the main transit neighbor. While these two factors need to be studied in more details, it
seems like the likelihood of these two factors to influence a landlocked country’s foreign
policy and security measures is dependent on the regional factors of wealth and stability.
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PART III
THEORETICAL ACCOUNT
After providing definition for the two dependent variables, foreign policy and
security, independent variables, wealth and stability, will be explained.
A.

Dependent variables

1.

Foreign Policy
A general definition of foreign policy suggests that, “It is the sum of

official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in
international relations… It is, in short, the focal point of an actor’s external relations”
(Hill, 2003, 3, 5). Within this braod definition of foreign policy, the concentration of this
thesis is on the external relations of landlocked states and how that is affected by regional
factors.
2.

Security
National security means safeguarding a nation with armed forces and

intelligence from external threats such as attacks or intelligence influxes. It encompasses
national defense and protection of geopolitical and economic interests (Holmes, 23).
However, under the bigger umbrella of national security, this thesis focuses on the
political security which is more about protecting the sovereignty, political system, and
safety of a society. As foreign policy and security policies are closely related and
reinforcing each other, in this thesis both are considered as two dependent variables in
order to see how they are influenced by wealth and stability, both independent variables,
of their respective regions.
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B. Independent variables
As discussed, landlocked countries’ prosperity and development are
dependent on their neighborhood. Meaning, if a region is developed and stable, the
landlocked country located in that region may benefit from the level of development and
stability. In contrast, instability and underdevelopment of a region intensify the
geographical handicap of the landlocked country more than maritime countries. Thus,
because of the dual vulnerability nature of landlocked countries dependency on the
wellbeing of the region, this thesis considers wealth and stability of the region as
independent variables which influence the foreign policy and security of a landlocked
country.
To define wealth and stability of regions, as independent variables, it is
crucial to explain what the meaning of region is and how regional groupings are defined
in this thesis. Thus, first, meaning of region and its limits are explained and next two
independent variables are defined.
1. Region
Regional groupings in this thesis are based on the UN M.49 which is used
by the United Nations for statistical purposes. In some cases, other academic groupings
are used as well. However, this thesis focuses on the countries which a case study
landlocked country shares borders with. In some cases, the influence and interests of
major powers of the region or global powers on the landlocked country are measured as
well. For instance, Armenia and Uzbekistan do not share borders with Russia or the
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United States, however, they are influenced by policies of these two major powers in
their respective regions.
According to the UN M.49, Afghanistan is in Southern Asia alongside
with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
Uzbekistan is categorized as a Central Asian country with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Switzerland is considered a Western European country and
Bolivia is a Southern American country. Botswana, another landlocked country of our
consideration, is in the Southern Africa region with Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Malawi. Armenia,
based on the UN M.49, is considered as part of Western Asia alongside seventeen other
countries including Israel and Saudi Arabia. Due to the large size of this categorization,
this thesis will study Armenia as part of the Southern Caucasus region. Armenia with its
two neighbors, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, make this region. The term Southern Caucasus,
as a sub-region, is used by several academic studies and organizations such as the World
Bank. While considering the regional influences on the Armenian security and foreign
policy, Iranian, Turkish, and Russian roles, in the region will be studied too.
2. Wealth of Regions
The World Bank categorizations based on GNI per capita are used to
distinguish between rich and poor regions studied in this research. According to the
World Bank, countries with $1,045 or less per capita are categorized as low-income and
countries with $1,046 to 4,125 per capita are classified as lower-middle income. Those
with $4,125 or above are upper-middle income, and countries with $12,736 per capita or
more are classified as high-income economies. Based on this classification, Afghanistan
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is a low-income country in a poor neighborhood. All eight countries of the Southern
Asian region, with the exception of Maldives, are either among low-income or lowermiddle-income economies. Uzbekistan, a lower-middle income economy itself, is
surrounded by Afghanistan, a low-income country, in the South, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan, both lower-middle income economies in the East, and Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan, both upper-middle income in the West and the North respectively. Because
the majority of the countries in this region are lower-middle income or low-income
economies, this thesis considers Central Asia as a poor region.
Armenia, another case study of this thesis, is a lower-middle income
landlocked country surrounded by Georgia, another lower-middle income, and Azerbaijan
an upper-middle income country. However, the South Caucasus region is in the
neighborhood of rich economies such as Russia, a high-income country, and Turkey and
Iran both upper-middle income countries. Given the size of the region, which is
comparatively small, and level of transactions with the neighbors of the region, South
Caucasus is categorized as a rich region in this thesis.
Botswana alongside ten other countries make up the region known as
Southern Africa: The Republic of South Africa plus Angola, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. From these eleven
countries four (Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Malawi) are low-income, three
(Zambia, Swaziland, and Lesotho) are lower-middle incomes, and four (Botswana, South
Africa, Namibia, and Angola) are upper-middle income economies. As the majority is
with the low-income and lower-middle income, the Southern African region is considered
as a poor region in this thesis.
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Bolivia is a lower-middle income country, but the neighborhood is rich.
There are four high-income economies in that region (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and
Venezuela), six upper-middle incomes (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Suriname,
Peru), and two lower-middle incomes (Bolivia and Guyana).
And finally, Switzerland, a high-income landlocked country itself, is in the
Western Europe surrounded by seven other high-income countries. Western Europe is
considered a rich region in this thesis.
3. Stability
In this thesis, regions with ongoing conflicts are considered unstable. The
South Asian region is challenged by three enduring conflicts with different levels of
intensity. The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, which is categorized as critical level of
conflict, Islamic militancy and Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Pakistan as significant
conflict, and the Kashmir conflict, between India and Pakistan, which is another
significant level of conflict in the region are the sources of instability in South Asia
(Council on Foreign Relations, 1 February 2016).
Three out of five Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan are facing different levels of militant conflicts. The Islamic militancy in the
Ferghana valley, which contains parts of all these three neighbors, and recruitments for
the ISIS are major concerns for all states of the region. This region, besides the Islamic
radicalism, suffers from weak governance and high levels of corruption (International
Crisis Group, January 2015). All countries in the region are landlocked including
Uzbekistan which is one of only two doubly landlocked countries in the world. Besides
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internal sources of instability, Central Asia is severely affected by long-lasting instability
in Afghanistan and periodic conflicts in the Southern Caucasus region.
The Southern Caucasus region is also considered as an unstable region due
to the conflict between Russia and Georgia, and constant hostility between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, South Caucasus is also affected by
the anti-Russian Islamic militancy in the Northern Caucasus region (Council on Foreign
Relations, 1 February 2016).
According to the Council on Foreign Relations’ global conflict tracker,
there are no ongoing conflicts, of any level of severity, in Western Europe, Southern
America, and Southern Africa. Thus, these three regions and landlocked countries
representing those regions (Switzerland, Botswana, and Bolivia), are considered as stable
neighborhoods.
C. Methodology
Wealth and stability of the regions are two variables which this thesis
assumes may affect the security and foreign policy of landlocked countries. In order to
answer the research question, regions, where landlocked countries are located, will be
divided into four categories of rich and stable, rich but unstable, poor and stable, and poor
and unstable.
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Unstable

Rich

Poor

Stable

South Caucasus

Western Europe

Armenia

Switzerland

Central, South, and South East Asia

Latin America and Southern Africa

Afghanistan, Uzbekistan

Bolivia, Botswana

Foreign policy papers of respected countries, statements by heads of states
and policy makers, and documents issued by the United Nations, the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are the primary sources for this research. Also,
secondary sources like scholarly books and articles will are utilized.
Thus, a comparative study of these countries, tracing their foreign policies
and how they are influenced by wealth and stability of their respective regions which
determine the power relation in the region will be conducted. At the end, cases studies
will be compared to each other and the conclusion will be drawn based on inductive
reasoning.
D. Cases
1. Rich and Stable Regions
Switzerland
Switzerland, is the only representative of high-income landlocked countries in this
thesis. This country is located in a rich and stable neighborhood. Switzerland, a small but
rich country in the Western Europe, has been lucky enough to avoid falling in the trap of
two World Wars in its neighborhood and managed to stay away from dwindling into the
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power spheres of the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The
country’s foreign policy makers believe that “neutrality” as a tool has helped Switzerland
not to get involved in the regional and international conflicts, maintain its security and
independence, and expand its economic thrive (FDFA). The current status of Switzerland
does not look like any other landlocked country outside Europe, however, this country’s
history is not much different from other landlocked countries. Thus, it is an example of
the importance of the neighborhood a landlocked country is located it.
While modern Switzerland does not resemble any characteristics of other
landlocked countries, especially of those out of the Western Europe, some similarities can
be found between its history and some current landlocked countries situation. For
instance, Switzerland suffered from bloody civil war in the 15th century and was used to
be an aggressor to the neighborhood in the early 16th century. After defeat in a war
against France, the "Eternal Peace" treaty was signed in 1516 according to which the
Swiss was supposed to provide mercenaries for French wars. Although, Switzerland
didn't engage in any war on its own account for more than two and half centuries, its
mercenaries were involved in conflicts around Europe on behalf of others. At the same
time Switzerland bleed from long-lasting civil wars based on religion like the rest of
Europe did at the time. France continued to interfere in domestic politics of Switzerland
and inflamed the religious wars there (Cronin, 2013, 59). This is another characteristic of
a weak state in the neighborhood of major powers. Resembles Armenia, Afghanistan, and
Bolivia to some extent.
Switzerland is the only case in this thesis that issues like transportation and
concession towards neighboring countries are not found in its foreign policy papers. The
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FDFA defines the objectives of Swiss foreign policy, based on the Federal Constitution,
as to safeguard Switzerland's interests, independence, well-being and security. The FDFA
attributes the country's foreign policy success in the areas such as peace building,
prevention of conflicts and extremism, and advocating for a just international order to its
permanent neutrality (FDFA, Foreign policy strategy and implementation 2016, 1). Its
long-lasting neutrality explains the geopolitical role of this landlocked country as a buffer
state among more powerful states.

Figure 1.Western Europe, Source: Geoatlas

Economic success. According to the World Bank data, Switzerland’s population
is 8.190 million and its size of GDP was $701.0 billion in 2014. This country is among
top three economies based on GDP per capita $88,120 in 2013. According to the CIA
World Factbook (2015) Switzerland’s economy is 72.6 percent based on services, 26.7
percent on industries and only 0.8 percent on agriculture products. “The fate of the Swiss
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economy is tightly linked to that of its neighbors in the euro zone, which purchases half
of Swiss exports”. According to Switzerland's Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
(FDFA), although it is not a member of European Union, country's most important
trading partners are the EU countries (FDFA, Foreign policy strategy and
Implementation, 2016, 2). Switzerland’s largest export partners are Germany (18.3
percent), the United States (13 percent), France (7.3 percent), United Kingdom (5
percent), and China (4.1 percent). The Country’s import partners are Germany (28
percent), Italy (9.7 percent), and France (8.1 percent) (CIA World Factook, 2014). The
role of the nature of export products is visible here. As mentioned, less than 1 percent of
the country’s economy is dependent on agriculture products. Being mostly a services
economy and exporting to the wealthy neighbors are the two main reasons behind this
landlocked country’s economic flourish.
Neutrality as foreign policy. Here is how land-lockedness determines Swiss'
foreign policy. It has to be neutral to escape the domination of powerful neighbors.
"Neutrality was an in important mean of self-preservation in a territory surrounded by
manor powers". It is true that neutrality has become part of Switzerland's national identity
and as Morris and White argue it is the most important reason behind the neglecting
European Union membership, however, Switzerland became neutral in 1515 to balance
power in the neighborhood (Morriss and White, 2011, 107-108).
FDFA defines neutrality as when a power does not take sides in a war.
Switzerland's neutrality is self-determined, permanent and armed" (FDFA, Swiss
Neutrality, 2). The FDFA claims that external neutrality of the Confederation enhances
internal cohesion because Switzerland is a multicultural country, taking sides with any
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European powers in the continent may cause internal crisis. Thus, the Federal
Constitution sees neutrality as a tool for protecting the independence of the country.
The FDFA describes the difference between law of neutrality and policy of
neutrality as the first referring to the provisions international law which a neutral state
should adhere when an armed conflict occurs between two or many other states. The
policy of neutrality, in contrast, refers to those actions which a neutral state takes to
ensure the credibility and effectiveness of it neutrality. Such action may be above and
beyond the legal obligations of a neutral state defined in the international law (FDFA,
The Essence of Swiss Neutrality, 2016, 1).
At the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 Switzerland decided to create a
federal army of 360,000 men to protect its neutrality (Cronin, 2013, 59). One and half
century later, after going under French occupation for 16 years, the Paris Agreement in 20
November 1815 recognized Switzerland's permanent neutrality granting its territorial
integrity. The Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Portugal, and France were the signatories of
this treaty. In 1907 The Hague Conventions introduced the rights and duties of neutral
states (FDFA). Switzerland has maintained neutrality since then.
Cronin believes that a country should have four characteristics in order to succeed
its neutrality: legitimation-either by Church or by more than one power-, challenging
geography- which makes it difficult to occupy-, no strategic importance or not worth to
sacrifice, but some economic value that major powers think worth the agreement (Cronin,
2013, 58). Apparently, Switzerland has all of these characteristics.
Besides these characteristics, was there any other reason why neutrality worked
out well for this landlocked country and not for Belgium and Luxembourg? Switzerland
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is in between two historic foes: Germany and France. Switzerland is repeatedly
endangered by enmity among these two giant neighbors. To understand why neutrality
worked for Switzerland and not for other European counterparts, Cronin argues that
Belgium (1839) and Luxembourg (1867) also declared neutrality, however, both were
deprived from having strong armed forces and their neutralities were guaranteed by great
powers of the time. The Swiss neutrality, in contrast, had three qualities: being
permanent, armed, and self-determined (FDFA, The Essence of Swiss Neutrality, 2016,
1). These distinctive features of Switzerland’s neutrality enabled the country to maintain
its neutrality during difficult times for centuries.
Switzerland’s neutrality was recognized by international treaties and supported by
its capable army. Switzerland didn’t rely solely on the good will of its neighbors.
Germany, for example, examined the possibility of invading France through Switzerland
and not through Belgium (Stovall, 1922, 200). Switzerland had developed strong armed
forces which made difficult for the aggressors to occupy this mountainous country.
Luxembourg and Belgium both were defenseless and didn't have the topography to
effectively resist foreign invasions. Thus, it was easy for Germany to occupy both
countries at the wake of the World War I (Cronin, 2013, 60-61).
Despite the fact that none of belligerents invaded Switzerland during the World
War I, its airspace sovereignty was violated by both side in a number of occasions. British
airplanes were the first to violate Switzerland's space territory and German planes did the
same. However, both offenders apologized each time after the violation. It doesn't mean
that this landlocked country was not affected by the war. It was dependent on both sides
of the war for importing supplies and exporting its productions (Stovall, 1922, 197-98).
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Here dual-vulnerability on the neighborhood, as a characteristic of landlocked states, is
visible in the case of Switzerland too. It was not only vulnerable because of its
dependency on the transit routes of its neighbors but also on their wellbeing. Because
their markets were, and still are, most important import and export partners of the
country.
Switzerland’s neutrality policy has changed over the course of history. For
instance, since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of bipolarity, Switzerland has
shown more interest in participating in international sanctions and non-military measures
enforced by the UN Security Council. Switzerland policy makers believe that after the
end of the Cold War the nature of security threats against the country’s interests has
changed as the conflicts in the international arena show more tendency towards intra-state
conflicts. Therefore, Switzerland has participated militarily in a number of occasions to
help international peace. Swiss’ forces presence in Bosnia since 1996, in Kosovo since
1999, and in Afghanistan since 2003 are examples of this change in Switzerland’s foreign
policy. Switzerland believes that contributing to the mentioned international missions are
not against the law of neutrality because the UN Security Council issued resolutions
demanded international security assistance for these cases. Thus, the existence of the UN
Security Council resolution changes the nature of conflicts from international to measure
to enforce resolutions of the Security Council. In contrast to the above examples,
Switzerland didn’t participate in the 2003 US led war against Iraq because in the absence
of a resolution by the Security Council, Swiss will not participate in any conflict (FDFA,
The Essence of Swiss Neutrality, 2016, 2).
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On the contrary, during the Cold War Switzerland didn't participate in military
measures or economic sanctions against other states. Between the two World Wars,
however, Switzerland, as a member of the League of Nations, participated in economic
sanctions against those countries which contravened the international law (FDFA, The
Essence of Swiss Neutrality, 2016, 2).
Conclusion. Switzerland does not suffer from most characteristics which trap
other landlocked countries. For example, Bolivia suffers from historical dispute with its
closest neighbor, Chile, and the neighborhood does not provide a very promising market
which could dispense it from the need to export its goods to other regions of the world.
Armenia faces blocked from two sides due to the historical dispute with Turkey and
Azerbaijan and at the same time it suffers from instability in the region. These problems
have limited its access to the sea and has no options but to show concession towards
countries like Iran and Russia. In the cases of Uzbekistan, it suffers from instability in the
neighborhood and being doubly landlocked and one of the most far countries from any
sea port. This situation has left Uzbekistan with only one option: Kazakhstan.
Afghanistan suffers from long-lasting internal conflict as well as regional instability and
border dispute with its closest neighbor, Pakistan.
All these four countries are affected by regional power struggles among major
powers of their respective regions. These countries face all identical weaknesses of
landlocked countries such as weak defense capabilities, dual-vulnerability, playing the
role of buffer states, underdevelopment and high-cost of transit. In contrast to these four,
Botswana is an exception due to the nature of its export which is not dependent on the
transportation routes of its neighboring countries. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the
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previous chapters, economists predict that, as Botswana’s diamond industry declines, it is
going to be more dependent on the neighborhood and thus more affected by regional
factors.
Switzerland does not suffer from most of above challenges. That’s mainly
because it is located in a rich and stable location. Even during the times when Europe
experienced two World Wars, Switzerland, thanks to its armed neutrality, managed to not
be burned in the war. However, one cannot conclude that Switzerland didn’t suffer from
the spillover of the war and didn’t face the symptoms of dual-vulnerability. Its economy
was, and still is, dependent on its neighborhood and all of its major trade partners were in
war. During the war it couldn’t have a safe and sovereign access to the sea. Nevertheless,
but neutrality enabled it to stay away from the war.
Some other landlocked countries also have experienced neutrality as a foreign
policy option. For instance, Botswana, during 1960s and 1970s, chose to have ad hoc
neutrality in the case of liberty struggles in the Southern African region, especially
towards its giant neighbor, Republic of South Africa. Because its diamond industry was
not developed yet and it was dependent on the South Africa’s transit facilities.
Afghanistan was a member of non-aligned states and managed to avoid taking sides
during the World War II. Its neutral foreign policy from 1929 to 1979 helped the country
to maintain its independence and security during half of the Cold War.
The question that if neutrality is going to be the solution for landlocked countries’
foreign policy is not addressed in the existing body of literature as a specific case for
landlocked countries. This question needs to be examined by scholars. In the case of
Switzerland, neutrality helped the country during two World Wars and the entire Cold
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War to stay safe, however, during peace time, stability and wealth of the Western Europe
region are the two factors behind the thrive of Switzerland.
2. Rich and Unstable Regions
Armenia
Armenia is a lower-middle economy with $11.64 billion GDP and $4,020 GNI per
capita (The World Bank, 2014). One third of Armenia’s 3.006 million population live
under poverty line (CIA World Factbook, 2015). However, three South Caucasus states—
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia—are encircled by three major powers, Russia, Turkey,
and Iran which are relatively rich. There is no comparison between military and
economic capacities of the South Caucasus states and the neighboring powers.
Geography exacerbates their vulnerability. Two of them, Armenia and Azerbaijan, do not
have territorial access to the sea and all three struggle with territorial disputes, ethnic
conflicts, and undefined borders (Shaffer, 2010, 52). Mentioned regional factors have
influenced the foreign policy options of Armenia Furthermore, the unending conflicts in
the region have afforded Russia and other regional powers strong leverage to influence
and shape the direction of the foreign policies of the South Caucasus states and in
particular Armenia. The region that this landlocked states is located is considered an
unstable but rich in this thesis.
Armenia faces a historical conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh region with
Azerbaijan which caused an inter-state war between these two neighbors in 1990s. At the
same time, Armenia faces blockade by Turkey due to another historical dispute over mass
killings of Armenians by the Ottoman empire in 1915. Besides having conflict with two
immediate neighbors, Armenia also is affected by Georgian-Russian conflict. Thus, the
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landlocked Armenia suffers from rivalries between major powers in the region, poverty,
and instability in the neighborhood. These factors influence this country’s foreign and
security policies.
Armenia, a former part of the Ottoman empire, gained independence on May 28,
1918 as a consequence of World War I. Given the precariousness of their status,
Armenian leaders thought that independence could only be sustained through external
support, and thus, looked to cultivate a relationship with Western Allied Powers. They
were right to be worried, their independent status barely lasted. In 1920 the Russian
Bolsheviks took over the newly stablished country (Mirzoyan, 2010, 10) and annexed it
to the Soviet Union. Only the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 returned the
possibility of independence. In this way, the entire history of the country from the 20th
century on--its creation as an independent state in 1918, its annexation to the Soviet
Union in 1920, and her regained independence in 1991, were all the result of power
struggles between regional, and to some extent, international powers. This reality is
evident in the current foreign policy and security issues of Armenia.
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Figure 2. Armenia and disputed Nagorno-Karabakh Source: The Economist

Foreign policy problems. In Armenia’s National Security Strategy (NSS, 2007)
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Azerbaijan’s probable aggression, as well as TurkishAzeri blockade against Armenia, are considered the two main national security threats.
The first was a territorial dispute with Azerbaijan which began in 1993. The second
stemmed from the historical hostility with Turkey over the killings of Armenian ethnics
by the Ottoman military during the World War I in 1915. Armenia, mainly under pressure
of Armenian diaspora, pursues international recognition of the killings as genocide
(Mirzoyan, 2010, 1). As a result, Armenia faces blockade by both neighbors. Azerbaijan
has blockaded Armenian access to the Caspian Sea. Turkey has blockaded the routes to
the Black Sea and Mediterranean markets.
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Therefore, NSS aims to introduce two main policies to reduce the negative affect
of those two threats. To balance these threats Armenia has increased her dependence on
the partnership with Russia, utilizing Georgian routes for transit as well as Iranian routes
to connect with the international markets. At the same time, Armenia seeks to have a
close relationship with other international players such as European Union, United States,
and NATO (Galstyan, 2013, 1). Armenia, in order to not become too dependent on any of
her partners, utilizes multi-directional foreign policy. She tries to balance her relations on
the one hand between Russia and the NATO, and on the other between Iran and the
United States.
As discussed, a complex layer of regional and international factors shapes
Armenia’s national security and foreign policy. It is not only affected by the antagonism
in country’s relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan and instability in the region, but also
by regional and international rivalries over dominance in the region. For instance, the
Georgian-Russian war 2008, the struggle between Iran and Turkey, as well as rivalries
between Russia and the United States are examples of the forces influencing Armenia.
These forces have influenced and shaped Armenia’s security and foreign policies for
decades. The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute with Azerbaijan and the historical hostility with
Turkey over the mass killings in 1915 continue to be the two major security problems for
Armenia.
Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which involves two
of three states in the South Caucasus, is considered the main obstacle against regional
integration and has blocked the inter-regional communication routes (Shahnazaryan,
2006, 357). The roots of the conflict are historical. It began because the Bolshevik
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government in 1921 decided to include the Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan regions
within the borders of the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan despite having a population that
was predominantly Armenian ethnics. This decision planted the seeds of a latent conflict
between Azeri and Armenian republics to be out broken by the fall of the Soviet Union.
On July 12, 1988 the NKAO (the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) declared
Nagorno-Karabakh's separation from Azerbaijan and in December 10 1991 declared de
facto independence. While the Armenian government declared that the NagornoKarabakh is not a dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan but rather between Azerbaijan
and Nagorno-Karabakh, however, the fact that many Armenians were fighting alongside
Nagorno-Karabakh army vastly complicated the situation. The war ended in 1994 after
Russian intervention when Armenia captured Nagorno-Karabakh and some surrounding
areas-about 20 percent of the Azeri territory- including the Lachin corridor which
connects the Armenian territory to Nagorno-Karabakh (Mirzoyan, 2010, 11-12). Since
then, the status quo has remained unaltered and Armenia faces blockade by Azerbaijan
and has lost her access to the Caspian Sea through Azeri routes.
The reasons behind reluctance in Armenian government to seek a solution for this
conflict, Shahnazaryan argues, are rooted in the Moscow and Tehran’s influence over
Yerevan. He argues that normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan is
not in the interest of Russia. At the same time, because normalization in Armenian and
Azeri relations may eventually resolve the problems between Armenia and Turkey, Iran
does not see it in her interest either (Shahnazaryan, 2006, 358). Thus the destiny of
stability and prosperity of the poorer and smaller countries of the region, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, is decided by the larger powers in the neighborhood.

39

Armenia is facing blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan and does not have
territorial contingency to Russia, the country’s largest partner. The Georgian transit route
to Russia is unstable after the Russian-Georgian 2008 war. The only stable transit option
for Armenia is Iran (Shaffer, 2010, 63). The closure of Tbilisi-Sukhumi railway and
international economic sanctions on Iran are reflected in the country's National Security
document in 2007 as national security threat.
Armenian simultaneous membership in the CSTO and Individual Cooperation
Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO (Shanazaryan, 2006, 355, 356) shows country's
multidirectional foreign policy. However, IPAP does not have the strength of a full NATO
membership. This is in contrast with the situation of Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Turkey: Historic enmity over 1915 genocide. Armenia campaigns for international
recognition of Armenian ethnic mass killings during the World War I by Ottoman
military, as genocide. Turkey has refused to recognize it and Armenian government has
been under growing pressure by Armenian diaspora to raise the issue in the international
platforms. The Turkish alliance with Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh war and
the blockade of the border since then has intensified Armenia's physical and
psychological isolation (Mirzoyan, 2010, 65). Despite several attempts to resolve the
problem, the genocide issue remains as main obstacle in Turkey-Armenia bilateral
relations.
During the Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008, Armenia last one of her two routes
to the international markets. Thus, the era of "Football Diplomacy" began. In an
unprecedented gesture, Turkish then president Abdullah Gul accepted an invitation by
Armenian president to watch the football match between Turkey and Armenian national
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team in Armenia. This event triggered hope for a breakthrough in the historically hostile
relationship between these two neighbors (Aras and Ozbay, 2008, 1). Football diplomacy,
eventually, didn’t work out and the land border between Turkey and Armenia remained
blocked. Nevertheless, Armenia tried to show concession towards Turkey after it lost its
transportation route to Russia due to Georgia-Russia war. This is an example of how
foreign policies of landlocked countries are determined by need to have access to the
international markets and ports.
Regional Rivalries. Besides the ongoing hostility in Armenia’s relations with
Turkey and Azerbaijan, another factor which affects Armenian national security and
foreign policy is the regional and international rivalries in the region. Security threats to
the Armenian national interests are imposed by both the power dynamics of the region as
well as instability in the South Caucasus. Armenia is caught up in between powers such
as Russia, Turkey, Iran, and American security interests in the region. Thus, Armenian
foreign policy options and security measures are determined by the interactions between
its powerful neighbors and great powers like Russia and the United States.
Armenia is located in the critical juncture of three major regional powers, Iran,
Turkey, and Russia. These three countries have ruled Armenia in different periods of
history. Their attitude towards Armenia still remains autocratic. The political history of
Armenia is shaped by the rivalries between these powers. For instance, Armenian
nationalism for liberation of Turkish Armenia from Muslim rule was formed as a
consequence of rivalry between the Ottoman and Russian Empires during late 19th and
early 20th centuries. This rivalry, which started in the second half of nineteenth century,
after the alignment between Armenians and the Russian Empire during the World War I,
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caused the Armenian massacre by Ottoman army in 1915 (Mirzoyan, 2010, 9, 10). The
memory of that massacre remains to cause continuous hostility in the relations of Turkey
and Armenia to the day.
Georgia. While being caught in between two foes, Turkey and Azerbaijan,
Georgia remains as a vital corridor for Armenia to transport goods to Russia and the
Black Sea. Unfortunately, Georgia is far from stable, and this variable plays a significant
role threatening Armenia’s national security and shaping its foreign policy. Armenia was
affected the most by the after-shocks of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. Because
Armenia does not have a direct access to the sea Armenia has no other choice but to
utilize Georgian transportation routes to access Russian markets. This war
obliterated/diminished/severely hampered? Armenian foreign trade by closing the only
open transportation route it had to the North (Galstyan, 2013, 1).
Russia. Shahnazaryan argues that Russia benefits from unresolved regional
conflicts, weak legitimacy of the Armenian and Azeri governments, presence of Russian
military bases in the region, and problems in Armenian-Turkish relations. He argues that
because settlement of the conflicts is not in the interest of the neighboring powers, Russia
and Iran, both, do not see formation of stable democracies desirable for their interests in
the region (Shahnazaryan, 2006, 360). Thus, the foreign policies and domestic politics of
these countries, especially Armenia, is formed under the influence of the neighboring
powers.
Since the independence in 1991, Armenian politics has been influenced by the
notion that Russia’s support for Armenia is indispensable. The leaders of the country see
Russia as the only force which helps the country to sustain stability against the pressures
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from Turkey and Azerbaijan. Thus, Armenia became a member of the Russian led
organizations such as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization as well as accepting to host Russian military basis in
Armenia since 1995. Russian military presence, after amendment of the 1995 treaty in
2010, is going to be for 49 years instead of 25 years. These (CSTO) (Grigoryan, 2014,
98-99).
In turn, Russia has used the fact that Armenian does not have territorial access to
the sea as a leverage to influence Armenian foreign policy to not join rival organizations
such as EU Association Agreement and stay within the Customs Union. Russia has
threatened stopping Armenian exports, blocking money transfers through Russian banks,
and not delivering security supports if war on Nagorno-Karabakh breaks out. These
pressures put Armenia in a situation that not only lost the opportunity to join EU
Association Agreement but also to followed Russia in cases such as the annexation of
Crimea to Russia and in 2014 voted against the UN resolution which declared the Crimea
referendum invalid. The later one caused strong antagonism in the European Union
against Armenia, causing further isolation of the country (Grigoryan, 2014, 106-107).
The Armenian-Russian relation has been based on two factors: first, the Russian
support to Armenia, and second, the geopolitics of the region. The first factor has
positioned Russia as power which historically has provided protection for Armenia
(Mirzoyan, 2010, 53). The examples of such protection can be traced back to the days
when the Russian empire was supporting the Armenian ethnic struggle against the
Ottoman empire and the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the support Armenia receives
from Russia to balance Turkey's pressure.
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The second factor, however, has caused a dilemma in the relations between
Armenia and Russia and the new realities in the geopolitics of the region. Under the
umbrella of cooperation with Russia, Armenia has not been able to utilize more options in
her foreign policy unlike her neighbors, Georgia and Azerbaijan, do and has remained
heavily dependent on Russia.
Iran. Armenia’s relationship with Islamic Republic of Iran, unlike her relations
with her three other neighbors, mainly Turkey and Azerbaijan, has been cordial without
any disputes over borders or ethnic conflicts. Since the independence of Armenia in 1991,
economic ties between both countries have increased steadily and in 2010 it reached $1
billion (Maniquet and Racimora, 2013, 4-8). Armenia has a special relationship with Iran
and considers Iran as the balancer power against Turkey and Azerbaijan and a permanent
alternative. Armenia uses this alliance with Iran to overcome the economic blockade by
Azerbaijan and Turkey. At the same time this relationship allows Yerevan to not become
solely dependent on her relations with Moscow. Iran is the fourth largest exporter to
Armenia with 6.5 percent share and the third importer from Armenia with 9.8 percent
share (Maniquet and Racimora, 2013, 4- 14).
There is a consensus in the Armenian political arena on the good relationship with
Iran, because, as Mirzoyan argues, the Iranians do not impose her will on the Armenian
internal politics and foreign policy (Mirzoyan, 2010, 107-108). However, Shahnazaryan
believes that Iran does not see normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations in her
interests and does influence Armenian foreign policy to prevent such a development in
Turkey-Armenia relationship. In this view, a Tehran-Moscow axis does impact the
political calculations in Yerevan not to seek settlement in the hostility with Turkey and at
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the same time not to join the pro-West axis which includes Azerbaijan and Georgia
(Shahnazaryan, 2006, 358). It is obvious that Armenia’s dependency on Iranian routes
enables Iran to influence Armenia’s security decisions and foreign policy. A stronger
presence in the Caucasus enables Iran to Weaken Azerbaijan in the hydrocarbon resources
market in the Caspian Sea and to oppose Turkey and Israel's policies in the region
(Maniquet and Racimora, 2013, 3).
Conclusion. Armenia is affected by the instability in the region as well as by the
ongoing rivalries between major powers. Examining the reasons behind foreign policy
behavior of Armenia shows that regional factors such as power dynamics between Turkey
and Iran, Russia and the United States, as well as intra-regional relations between
Armenian and its two South Caucasian neighbors, are results of the fact that this
landlocked country is located in an unstable region with powerful neighbors. The rivalries
between bigger powers dictate the foreign policy options of Armenia. National security
threats are also identified by how those threats might impact Armenia’s access to the sea
and international markets.
3. Poor but Stable Regions
Bolivia and Botswana, in this thesis, represent Be regions. First Bolivia is studied,
and then, Botswana.
a. Bolivia
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Bolivia, as established in the parameters laid out in a previous chapter, is located
in a stable but relatively poor neighborhood. Bolivia is ranked among lower-middle
income economies with $33 billion GDP size and $2,870 GNI. The size of its population
is 10.56 million (the World Bank, 2015). Resources such as oil and natural gas cover half
of the country’s exports income. Bolivia’s main export partners are Brazil and Argentina.
Despite being a natural resource rich country, Bolivia is still one of the least developed
countries in South America with 45 percent of its population below poverty line (CIA,
2015). For Bolivia, sovereign
access to the sea is considered
as the key reducing trade cost
and catch the development
ladder (Dominguez, 2003, 19).
Besides
underdevelopment and
poverty, Bolivia suffers from

Figure 3. The areas Bolivia lost to Chile in 1883. Source: The Economist

identity-based conflicts between Andean indigenous population and an elite group,
descendants of the Spanish conquistadors. A clear example of this pattern is 2008 unrests
in Santa Cruz city in the eastern part of the country. The economic and political elite
stood against the reform policies of President Evo Morales and stopped the gas export to
Argentina and Brazil (Bluestone, 2009, 69).
Bolivia’s main foreign policy problem is its historical demand to regain its
coastline which was lost to Chile in the war of Pacific (1879–1883). Bolivia and Peru
both lost significant parts of their land which had rich nitrate mines. This loss was far
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more severe for Bolivia, however, because beyond a sizable chunk of territory, it also lost
access to the sea (Van Der Ree, 2010, 213). Thus, the country’s foreign policy is shaped
almost entirely by its landlocked status and issues related to the regional balance of
power. Because Bolivia is one the poorest countries in the region with a relatively
underdeveloped transportation system, poverty in the region is not as critical constraint,
as its own infrastructure underdevelopment.
Regional power dynamics. Boundary disputes in Latin America have been the
main source of inter-state conflicts in the last four decades. Among these we can include
the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras, the 1982 skirmish between Argentina
and the United Kingdom, the 1995 combat between Ecuador and Peru, the 1987 clashes
between Colombia and Venezuela, the 1978 hostilities between Chile and Argentina, and
the ongoing unresolved dispute between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia (Dominguez, 2003, 18).
Dominguez argues that despite the territorial feuds between South American countries
inherited from the colonial Spanish and British rule era, there have been considerably less
armed inter-state conflicts. According to his argument, regional balance of power, relative
isolation from the center of the world power dynamics, and sense of belonging to one
larger cultural, and possibly political, community are important in war containment in
Latin America. He believes that these three factors are the core for peace in the region
which have made the inter-state wars rare and short lived and at the same time keeps the
whole area far from international wars (Dominguez, 2003, 21-22, 36).
In addition, Dominguez contends that when states give priority to development,
territorial disputes become secondary and easy to settle. In contrast, if states prioritize
their boundary and territorial disputes over development, it is more likely to have more
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conflicts over territory. Thus, the grand strategy of states matters the most (Dominguez,
2003, 7). This observation can be applied to other cases such as Uzbekistan, Armenia,
and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan understood the importance of access to the global markets
via Kazakhstan, therefore, settled its territorial disputes quickly. In contrast, Armenia
didn't prioritize development over historical territorial Nagorno-Karabakh dispute with
Azerbaijan.
Chile. Bolivia lost its coastline as a result of the Pacific War against Chile in
1884, however, according to the treaty which ended the war, "Bolivia got access to the
Chilean port of Arica via road and railway" (Armstrong, 2010, 3). Still, Chile has
deciding power over Bolivia's transportations through its soil which forces Bolivia to
trade with Brazil and Argentina. Unfortunately for the country, its exports are not
appealing in these two countries (Armstrong, 2010, 3).
Being geographically central located Bolivia has benefited from its location and is
not much affected by the transit routes of the neighboring countries (Sachs and others,
2010, 44). Nonetheless, the historical tension with the closest maritime neighbor, Chile,
has cost delays in gas exports via Chilean ports (Sachs and others, 46). Although the
regional environment and neighboring countries’ infrastructures are adequate, domestic
underdevelopment of Bolivia and Paraguay prevent both countries from taking advantage
of their neighbor’s infrastructure capacity. While Bolivia has not been much affected by
instability in the region, it has definitely been affected by relatively hostile relations with
its neighbors. For instance, although it was in Bolivia's interest to export natural gas to
the United States through Chilean ports, domestic politics in Bolivia triggered large-scale
protests in 2003 against using Chilean ports due to the historical enmity. That crisis
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eventually ousted Bolivian President Sanchez de Lozada (Van Der Ree, 2010, 213). In
2001 Bolivian civil society and opposition parties boldly condemned the negotiations
between the Bolivian government and Chile over exporting gas via Chilean territory. The
protests mobilized by the civil society caused 60 deaths and eventually ousted president
Sanchez de Lozada in 2003. The new government held a referendum and Bolivians voted
against exporting gas through Chilean territory. Bolivian new president Carlos Mesa
(2003-2005) offered gas to Chile if Chile guaranteed sovereign access for Bolivia to the
sea. However, he couldn't complete his term, due to domestic splits. The next president
Evo Morales (2006-present) started a trust-building dialogue with Chile (Wehner, 2011,
37). However, president Morales came to power using a nationalistic rhetoric which was
mainly directed against Chile, he managed to reduce anti-Chilean sentiments in Bolivia
with reopening the negotiations (Van Der Ree, 2009, 219). This started a new era in the
relationship between two countries.
Morales, a leftist President, created a new domestic foe to replace Chile in
internal discourse--the liberal market and the elite who supported it. This socialistic
approach, simultaneously, reduced the enmity against Chile and increased the regional
support for the Bolivian question for access to the sea. Countries like Venezuela,
Uruguay, and Ecuador- all with strong left movements, have supported Bolivia, a socialist
partner, against neoliberal Chile. Thus, President Morales was able to invite his Chilean
counterpart to his inauguration ceremony in 2006 and, be invited in turn to Chilean
president’s Michelle Bachelet inauguration without much of a political cost. Indeed, it
was the first time these two countries attended each other’s inaugurations in over 50
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years. During 2006-2007 period the leaders of Bolivia and Chile met each other nine
times (Wehner, 2011, 43-44).
The Day of the Sea was usually utilized as a chance to express anti-Chilean
statements, a way to unify the nation behind the demand for sovereign access to the sea.
However, president Morales, in 2008, used the day to stress on improvements in the two
neighbors’ relations: "What we have to say with all sincerity is that we have established
an important basis for developing mutual trust from pueblo to pueblo and from
government to government with our neighbour brother, the Republic of Chile. I
understand that to solve any issue, be it national, familial or international, with our
neighbors, mutual trust is the most important aspect. Trust between the social forces of
Bolivia and Chile, trust between the military forces of Bolivia and those of Chile. We
acknowledged that last year, for the first time in history, Chile's army paid tribute to Mr.
Eduardo Abaroa. These are important steps and clear signs that these two countries want
to solve a historical problem, the issue of the sea" (Wehner, 2011, 46-47).
As a result of the trust building process that began with the inauguration of Evo
Morales’ presidency, Bolivia got the right to import from Iquique harbor ports of Chile
since 2008. Bolivia, however, still demands a sovereign outlet to the sea from Chile. At
the same time, Wehner argues that the decline in president Morales' popularity in Bolivia
has forced him to re-initiate anti-Chilean narrative in the domestic discourse which
eventually affects country's foreign policy stance. Such stances include president
Morales' willingness to present the Bolivian case to the International Court at The Hague.
Chile’s reaction to such demand has always been that it is not negotiable (Wehner, 2011,
48). The most recent development on the issue is that the Bolivian legal team of maritime
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advisers has submitted Bolivia's lawsuit to the International Court of Justice at The
Hague demanding that "Chile has an obligation to negotiate an agreement that grants
Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean" (Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2016). This is an illustration on the securitization of the access to the sea issue in
Bolivia’s domestic politics. Although the trust building process which started in 2006 is
not completely stopped, however, it can be reversed as the strong enmity sentiment
amongst publics towards the other country still exist and politicians may get tempted to
utilize it to gain popular support, as it has happened in the history of these neighbors.
Landlocked-ness forces Bolivia to trade mainly with its immediate neighbors. For
instance, Brazil is Bolivia's largest export market which receives 42 percent of Bolivian
exports (Armstrong, 2010, 3). Bolivian exports to Chile in 2002 amounted $23 million
while Chilean exports to Bolivia was $14 million in the same year. The extreme
imbalance in trade between Chile and Bolivia, in the favor of Chile, is attributed to the
fact that Bolivia has lost its coastline to Chile and now Bolivia has no other option but to
be exploited by its immediate neighbors including Chile (Van Der Ree, 2010, 214).
Although Bolivia signed a treaty in 1904 with Chile accepting the status quo of
the border between two countries, the hope for re-achieving the lost coastline didn't
disappear from Bolivian nationalistic discourse. In 1978, it caused breaking diplomatic
relations between these two countries. In 2004 when the 100 anniversary of the peace
treaty was close, this discourse regained momentum (Van De Ree, 2010, 216). A similar
peace treaty was signed between Chile and Peru in 1929 and another in 1950 to settle the
conflict over maritime demarcation between the two neighbors. Still, Peru has not been
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satisfied by those treaties. In 2005, for instance, Peru introduce a new proposal which
would allow Peru to gain control over 40,000 square kilometers of sea.
Chile’s reaction to these territorial claims by its northern neighbors has been
emphasizing that there is not an unsettled issue over territory with Bolivia and Peru.
Chile argues that both issues, with Bolivia and Peru, were settled in 1904 and 1929
within bilateral treaties framework. President Ricardo Lagos of Chile, in 2014 said that
"There exist no pending issues of sovereignty... This matter has been resolved in treaty
we have signed over a century ago" (Van Der Ree, 2010, 216-17). Chile has constructed a
legalistic position for itself. As far as the Chileans are concerned, there is nothing to
negotiate, the matter is settled law.
Latin American leaders have not welcomed Chile’s legalistic argument, especially
concerning Bolivia’s claim for access to the sea. Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela have
shown support of Bolivia. The late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, for instance,
openly expressed his wish to ‘take a swim in the Bolivian sea’ (Van Der Ree, 2010, 21617). Bolivia has responded to Chile's legalistic approach with appealing to the Latin
American summit in 2004. In the same year, Peru appealed to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in The Hague (Van Der Ree, 2010, 217).
Besides the historical desire for regaining territorial access to the Pacific Ocean,
Bolivians think that access to the sea would enable them to reduce their trade dependency
on Brazil and other neighbors by exporting oil and gas to other nations in the Pacific.
Bolivia has higher amounts of oil and natural gas reserves compared to Chile and Peru.
However, it cannot compete with them in extraction and export, due to the landlockedness (Armstrong, 2010, 4).
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Bolivia finds itself in a difficult position because it not only should convince
Chile to give a portion of disputed land to Bolivia, but also should encourage Peru to not
to oppose such an agreement. Thus, Bolivia is affected by the spillover of the problem
between Peru and Chile. Peru has offered a 1.4 square mile patch of sand that Bolivia will
lease from Peru for 99 years. This offer was a diplomatic act by Peru to get closer to
Bolivia and pressure Chile in the regional and international arenas to give up some
territory (Armstrong, 2010, 7). President Morales during signing the deal with Peruvan
president Alan García, said “This opens the door for Bolivians to have an international
port, to the use of the ocean for global trade and for Bolivian products to have better
access to global markets… Bolivia, sooner or later, will return to the sea" (Carroll, 2010).
However, Bolivia can use this port as duty free space and will not have sovereign
authority over it. This situation doesn’t satisfy Bolivian territorial claims against Chile.
Argentina. Bolivia's has enormous natural gas reserves—second only to
Venezuela in South America. In 1958, Bolivia wanted to build a pipeline to export gas to
Brazil but that project didn't succeed due to Brazil's economic shortcomings. Thus,
Bolivia's ambitious project to build the first continental pipeline was delayed until 1972
when it built the pipeline with Argentina to export natural gas to the later (Stone, 2011,
63).
Besides Argentina's domestic need for gas consumption, Buenos Aires was
interested in having more influence and form alliance with Bolivia for regional
geopolitical rivalries, especially against Chile (Stone, 2001, 64). These issues underline
another aspect of the geopolitics of the region where Bolivia is located. Brazil was
unhappy with the level of influence Argentina was enjoying by exploring and importing
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Bolivian gas. Thus, Brazil entered the race and signed a contract of 2.5 bcm per year in
1974 and then increased to 4.1 bcm per year in 1978. Public opinion did not support these
contracts, however, as the promises of the deal with Argentina were not delivered and
their lives were not changed. In that way, populist politicians who were not happy from
the deal with Brazil, forced the government to stop exporting gas to Brazil. Argentina,
which had no competitors, continued to import Bolivian gas with low price until the end
of the 1980s and didn't renew the contract in 1990s. Argentina, after exploring its own
natural gas in the 1990s, started exporting gas to Chile. In 2000, it completely stopped
importing gas from Bolivia. Bolivia, desperate for a new market, approached Brazil again
and the new pipeline began to construct in 1997 (Stone, 2011, 66-68). Landlocked-ness
was squeezing Bolivia from all sides. Given that exporting to other continents would
require passing through Chile or Peru’s territories, it had to either to export underpriced
gas to its giant neighbors—Brazil and Argentina—or not to export at all. Under these
circumstances, president Sanchez of Bolivia decided to export gas through Chile because
the Peruvian route would cost between $300 to $600 million more than Chilean route
(Stone, 2011, 66). But as previously discussed, this decision led to widespread protests
which eventually ousted president Sanchez.
Brazil. Brazil initiated a mid-range political institution under the Union of South
American States (UNASUR) to pursue a joined security agenda to face mutual security
threats such as organized crime and violent non-state actors. This new regional order
would enable Brazil to lead the region and exclude the United States from regional power
dynamics. Brazil's growing economy-now one of the 10 largest economies in the worldmade this possible, while United States' efforts to the end of the Cold War to build a
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hemispheric security forum which would unite the Latin America and the United States,
didn't pay off. Similarly, Venezuelan former president Hugo Chavez efforts to create new
regional security order under "Bolivarian alliance" of states to balance United States'
power in the region didn't succeed (Trinkunas, 2013, 83).
Trinkunas argue that the United States has lost influence over regional security
issues in the last decade. The fact that South America was not much affected by the
global financial crisis enabled states like Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela to lead the
region towards new agendas which does not give much room to the United States. Brazil,
as a regional major power, took the lead in solving Bolivia's separatism crisis in 2008.
The UNASUR and the South American Defense Council (CDS) platforms to manage this
crisis and used its political and economic leverage (Trinkunas, 2013,84- 90). Therefore,
Brazil has been executing a more active foreign policy in the region and has stand
alongside Bolivia including supporting Bolivian cause against Chile. On the other hand,
the fact that 29.8 percent of Bolivian exports go to Brazil (CIA, World Factbook, 2016)
gives Brazil leverage over Bolivia. Bolivia does not have enough trading partners to
balance its trade with Brazil.
Conclusion. Bolivia, although rich with natural resources, suffers from
underdevelopment. This underdevelopment impacts country’s security and foreign policy.
Landlocked-ness not only has deprived Bolivia from easy access to international markets
but also has caused a historical enmity towards its closest neighbor, Chile. This hatred has
triggered a popular anti-Chilean nationalism which is ready to prioritize historical
disputes over country’s development. Politicians and leaders have used this sentiment to
securitize the dispute with Chile and build a domestic support for their agendas. In a
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number of occasions, this populistic narrative overthrew governments who tried to find a
solution for the dispute.
But on the other hand, it is also true that not having sovereign access to the sea is
the reason why Bolivia is poorer than Chile or Peru, although, these two neighbors do not
have as much natural resources as Bolivia does. However, Chile and Peru are better off
mainly because they have free access to the sea and thus to the international markets.
Bolivia has got few trade options and constrained to do business with few immediate
neighbors, mainly with Brazil and Argentina. This creates a vicious cycle. Bolivia is
poorer than it would otherwise be because it is landlocked and because it is landlocked, it
cannot find a development strategy to take advantage even of the relative stability and
development of its immediate neighbors.
Bolivia is among those landlocked countries which are located in stable but
relatively poor neighborhoods. Bolivia’s foreign policy is more affected by its landlocked
status, domestic poverty and underdevelopment. Unlike, Idan and Shaffer’s (2011)
argument about concession in landlocked states’ foreign policies towards their maritime
neighbors, Bolivia has a hostile relationship with Chile, Bolivia’s closest transport route
to the Sea. Thus, it can be argued that besides trade and transportation, there are other
factors which affect Landlocked states’ foreign policies, like nationalism and national
identity. This factor will be examined later in more details in Afghanistan’s case.
b. Botswana
Botswana is considered a development success story. In half a century, it managed
to jump from a low-income country with $70 GDP per capita in 1966 to $3000 in 2000
and $7240 in 2015 (The World Bank, 2015). In 1960s, Botswana was considered a
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"hostage" of South Africa, because it was heavily dependent on that country's
transportation routes and had few trading partners (Neimann, 1993, 1). Thanks to the
diamond export industry, Botswana has seen a steady GDP growth of 5 percent annually
in the last decade, placing the country amongst the upper-middle-income economies (The
World Bank, Overview, 2015), a rare status for non-European Landlocked states. This
chapter examines how diamond industry reduced Botswana’s dependence on its
neighborhood and shaped Botswaana’s foregin policy and security measures in the past 6
decades.
An Exceptional Landlocked State. Botswana is an exceptional case among
landlocked countries in the sense that it has a higher human development level compared
to its neighbors. This is the case mainly because the maritime neighbors- Angola and
Mozambique- are drowned in long-lasting civil wars while Botswana enjoys domestic
stability and relatively strong infrastructure and is not dependent on the transit routes of
either of those countries. Instead, Botswana’s economy is heavily dependent on the
export of diamonds—the precious stones account for 84% of the country’s exports—a
commodity which has high value and is light in weight and thus can be transported as
plane cargo. This happy state of affairs means that the Bostwanan economy is not hostage
to the vicissitudes of its maritime neighbors. (Faye, Mcarthur, Sachs, and Snow, 2004,
44-55).
Chowdhury and Erdenebileg (2006) attribute Botswana’s economic success to its
good governance, good relations with the maritime neighbors, especially South Africa,
and good regional transit transport agreement (Chowdhury and Erdenebileg, 2006, 59).
Collier believes that Botswana did well economically because it developed a good
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management for its natural resources, especially diamonds. Botswana was fortunate
enough to be resource rich and equally fortunate not to fall in resource trap (Collier,
2007, 73).

Figure 4. Southern Africa

The above notwithstanding, Botswana's economy has been shocked by
fluctuations in the global markets and declining demand in rich countries to buy
diamonds in recent years. At the same time, non-mining sector growth has declined from
9.4 percent in 2011 to 4.3 percent in 2014 (The World Bank, Overview, 2015). Although
Botswana has faced enormous success since independence, it has not diversified its
economy and remains over-dependent on the diamond as single-export. One of the results
of over dependence on diamonds export is the low employment rate (Taylor and
Mokhawa, 2003, 263) and this issue has caused an increasing income inequality in
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Botswana. In other words, although widely successful, the particular configuration of
circumstances behind its prosperity might not be sustainable in the long run.
Like many other single-export dependent countries, Botswana faces problems
when demand for its diamonds in the international markets declines. The World Bank’s
estimations show that Botswana’s diamond production has already reached its maximum
level. Although, the industry might remain stable for another generation, being so
dependent on a single-export the concomitant decline in the global markets for diamonds
poses serious questions about the future of the country’s economy if it is not diversified.
The problem is that as Botswana’s reliance on diamonds export declines, other types of
exports would increase the country’s dependence on the neighborhood’s transit routes for
export and consequently would become more affected by the instability in the region.
Besides being a single-export economy, another problem Botswana faces is the
global campaign against "conflict-diamonds". Several international NGOs under
Kimberley Process -a joint governments, industry and civil society initiative to stem the
flow of conflict diamonds – rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars
against legitimate governments (Kimberly process, 2016)- stand against the diamonds
which come from conflict areas in Africa. Although Botswana has been a supporter of
this campaign, still, it is concerned that international consumers may refuse to buy any
kind of diamonds under the psychological affects this campaign. That would be a disaster
for Botswana.
Botswana had a two-fold foreign policy on the anti-conflict campaign. While it
has favored international restrictions on conflict-diamonds, it has also emphasized that
Botswana's diamonds are conflict free. Hence, president Mogae launched the “diamond
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for development” campaign in 2001 in London illustrating the importance of diamonds in
Botswana’s wellbeing especially offering free school education for its citizens.
Botswana's position was supported by South Africa and Namibia, because of their own
diamonds industries. The diamonds for development campaign, however, triggered a
reaction from international NGO’s to question Botswana’s claim that its diamonds are
conflict free. They found out that Botswana has been violent against the indigenous
people of San who lived in the area of diamond mines. Members of this indigenous ethnic
group were forced out of their inherited homes. This aroused an international movement
by NGO’s against Botswana’s diamond industry. Botswana was close to facing an
international boycott (Mokhawa, and Taylor, 2003, 271-72). This is another example of
the vulnerability of a landlocked country which dependent on single-export.
Foreign Policy. During the apartheid rule in South Africa, Botswana's foreign
policy had two main considerations that sometimes worked at cross purposes: first, not to
give an excuse to the Republic of South Africa to invade Botswana or intervene in its
domestic affairs. And second, to avoid any action which appeared to legitimize the
apartheid system in South Africa. Botswana would avoid taking sides in international
organizations such as the U.N. when the question of apartheid in South Africa was
concerned. Seretse Khama, Botswana's then president, once said that " [a]s a consequence
of Botswana's geographical situation, we face unusual and onerous handicaps.... Whilst
Botswana accepts that we are part of the Southern African economic complex and that the
harsh fact of history and geography cannot be obliterated, for obvious reasons, we have to
maintain normal friendly relations with South Africa” (Neimann, 1993, 2-3). President
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Khama’s statement illustrates clearly that landlocked-ness and being neighbors with a
major regional power, can have a large influence on a country’s foreign policy choices.
Nonetheless, as Botswana got more affected by the instability in the region during
the 1970s, it altered its foreign policy towards supporting the struggle against White
minority rule in Southern African states including the Republic of South Africa. As a
result of the instability in the region, Botswana was hosting 30,000 refugees from its
neighbors including South Africa. Thus, Botswana, alongside Tanzania, Zambia, and
Mozambique, formed the Frontline States in 1974 to support the liberation movements in
the region. However, the member countries agreed that, unlike others, Botswana would
not provide safe havens for the liberation fighters and would not participate in the
sanctions against Rhodesia, present day Zimbabwe.
President Khama's position on the struggle against white minority rule in
the region changed with time. In reaction to South Africa's unwillingness for the
negotiations during the 1970s, president Khama, in contrast to his early remarks, said that
"Africa will have no other choice but to give full support to the freedom struggle... We
have a moral obligation to insist on the restoration of human rights in the countries
surrounding us; for the absence of peace in these countries is a threat to our own peace,
without which we cannot survive. Therefore, if I speak the way I do it is because of my
country's geopolitical situation" (Neimann, 1993, 4). It is interesting that president
Khama used the geopolitical location of Botswana as an excuse earlier in the 1960s to not
to participate in any action which would irritate South Africa, but in 1976 he used the
same logic to justify his stance against the white minority rule in Southern African states.
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From the mid-1970s on when Agnola and Mozambique achieved independence,
the balance of power in Southern African region turned against the Republic of South
Africa and the "white coalition" was defeated in Rhodesia. By then western powers such
as the United States and Britain were reluctant to continue to support the apartheid
regime in South Africa (Niemann, 1993, 11). All of this was happening when Botswana's
diamond industry started its boom. In 1975, Botswana managed to broker a contract with
De Beer company which was based on equal 50/50 percent share for Botswana and De
Beers overall mines in the country, a marked contrast with the past when De Beers
enjoyed 85 percent share in Botswana’s mining industry (Taylor and Mokhawa, 2003,
263). Diamonds were light and profitable enough to export to Europe by air
transportation. Meaning, Botswana was not dependent on South Africa's transportation
routes for export trade or on its markets to sell diamonds (Neimann, 1993, 11). Hence,
all these factors enabled Botswana to utilize a foreign policy independent of South Africa.
Geopolitical changes such as the liberation of Angola and Mozambique altered
the balance of power in Southern Africa against the apartheid regime in South Africa.
This change in power dynamics, increase in Botswana’s diamonds exports, and the extent
Botswana was affected by the conflict in the region can explain the foreign policy shifts
of this landlocked country.
Conclusion. Botswana’s case shows that thanks to the diamonds export, this
country is not much affected by instability in the region or the poor infrastructure in the
maritime neighbors. This is exactly in contrast with the situation of other landlocked
countries studied in this thesis. For instance, Bolivia is affected by the historical border
disputes and power dynamics between major actors of the region. These factors restrict
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Bolivia’s exports to major international markets. Armenia is affected not only by
historical enmity with Azerbaijan and Turkey but also by instability in Georgia which
causes blocking Armenia’s proximity to the Russian markets and its transportation routes.
Similarly, Uzbekistan, as discussed, is affected by the conflicts in the neighborhood and
has no other option but to show concession towards Kazakhstan and Russia. Bolivia,
Armenia, and Uzbekistan are affected by the power dynamics in their respective regions
mainly because their exports need land transportation. In the case of Armenia and
Uzbekistan, they are not only affected by being landlocked and surrounded by poor
neighbors but also because their neighbors are unstable.
On the contrary, in the case of Botswana, instability in the maritime neighbors
does not affect its international trade, and thus, dual vulnerability is not applicable in this
case. Therefore, Botswana’s foreign policy and security measures are not influenced by
its landlocked status. However, looking into the history of this landlocked country, one
can argue that diamond mines will not last forever while geography is not going away.
Thus, It is probable that in future, similar to the time when Botswana didn’t enjoy the
luxury of diamonds industry, the country’s foreign policy and security get affected by the
realities of the its neighborhood. Similar to other landlocked states.
4.

Poor and Unstable Regions

a. Uzbekistan, the doubly landlocked
Uzbekistan is one of only two doubly landlocked states in the world. The region
where this country is located is unstable and poor with relatively weak states. Uzbekistan
neighbors are Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
All landlocked states themselves. None of these neighbors are rich or a major power.
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Nonetheless, instability in the region and extra-regional power struggles
disproportionately shape the country’s security measures and foreign policy. Thus, in this
thesis’ two by two table theoretical framework, the region which Uzbekistan is located
falls under the category of unstable and poor regions.
Being doubly landlocked makes transit more difficult for Uzbekistan,
because, it has to pass through, at least, two other countries to reach to the sea.
Uzbekistan inherited relatively good transportation infrastructures from the Soviet Union,
however, conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan have posed the threat to Uzbekistan’s
security and caused restrictions on her transportation routes (Idan and Shaffer, 2011, 259260).
Uzbekistan produces enough oil to meet its domestic consumption, but it is not
sufficient for export. The country's economy is dependent mainly on agricultural
products; cotton being the main export. Thus, roads and railways are the main means of
transportation. Idan and Shaffer believe that landlocked-ness has three main constraints
on Uzbekistan's foreign policy: leader's foreign policy decisions are influenced by the
fact that the country is landlocked; transportation is a foreign policy priority; and it has a
special policy towards Russia and Kazakhstan due to heavy dependency on Russian
markets and Kazakhstan's transit routes (Idan and Shaffer, 2011, 260).
Idan and Shaffer quote Uzbek president Islam Karimov’s speech from 1998:
“World experience testifies, and Uzbekistan is another proof, that a country having no
direct access to international waters significantly suffers in international economics. This
is why we continue to seek new solutions to the problem of providing our exports with an
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effective transportation system and obtaining access to international waters” (Idan and
Shaffer, 2011, 260).
Similarly, Uzbekistan ministry of Foreign Affairs declares that: “The geographic
isolation of Central Asia causes serious problems for our countries. In this respect,
Uzbekistan will continue its efforts towards “disenclavization” of Central Asia by
creating alternative transport and communication corridors” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2008). These quotes are examples of the level of
importance of transportation and access to the sea for Uzbekistan’s foreign policy.
Uzbekistan’s population of 30.7 million comprises 40 percent of Central Asia's
inhabitants. The IMF considers Uzbekistan as rich in natural resources such as uranium,
copper, gold, and natural gas and the sixth largest producer of cotton in the world and
agriculture makes about 18 percent of country's GDP (IMF Country Report No. 13/278,
2013, 5). Uzbekistan is considered a lower middle-income country with $2,036.7 (2014)
GDP per capita. This figure is lower than Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan which are
classified as upper-middle income economies. Nonetheless, Uzbekistan's GDP per capita
is larger than her three other neighbors: Afghanistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan (The
World Bank, 2016). The country's leadership aims to gain upper-middle income status by
2030 (IMF Country Report No. 13/278, 2013, 5).
Russia, Kazakhstan, and China are major export destinations for Uzbekistan, with
the first of the three having the distinction of being an enormous source of remittances,
and thus a country with disproportionate economic leverage over the Uzbekis. The
Central Asian country’s export market share has been falling in recent years. Exports are
focused almost exclusively around various commodities—gas, gold, cotton and metals—
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and agricultural products, which together amount to about 85 percent of exports. The
geographic concentration of exports has been rising, with Russia, China, and Turkey
being the three largest export destinations in 2011. (IMF 20). According to CIA
Uzbekistan’s major export partners are China 21.2 percent, Kazakhstan15.9 percent,
Turkey 15.8 percent, Russia 14.7 percent, Bangladesh, and 9.5 percent, Kyrgyzstan 4
percent. And the main import partners are Russia 20.7 percent, China 16.6 percent, South
Korea 16.4 percent, Kazakhstan 12.5 percent, Germany 4.6 percent, Turkey 4.2 percent,
Ukraine 4 percent (CIA Factbook, 2012, 803).
Between Russia and United States. Uzbekistan's dependency on Russia stems
almost entirely from the fact that the country is landlocked with few other transit options.
The 1990s conflicts in Tajikistan and decades of war in Afghanistan have deprived
Uzbekistan from access to Pakistani and Indian ports. Indeed, Russia is not only
Uzbekistan's biggest commercial partner, but almost all of Uzbek exports to Europe go
through its northern neighbor. Thus, Russia is the largest market for Uzbekistan’s exports
as well as the main transit route. Another factor is that during the Soviet period,
Uzbekistan was designed to function as the transportation hub for Central Asia,
connecting the region’s transportation system to Russia, and thus its infrastructure is very
much a legacy of that period, as it continues that role to this day (Idan and Shaffer, 261).
These facts give Russia leverage to influence Uzbekistan’s security and foreign policy
limiting the country’s foreign policy options when Russia’s interests are under question.
Uzbekistan tried a number of times to alter her foreign policy in other directions
in order to get closer to the United States and find allies in the West. For instance, after
the 9/11 attacks Uzbekistan gave Karshi-Khanabad air base to the United States to use for
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military supplies in the war in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan gave the facility to the United
States to contribute in the war against terror without demanding money for it. This
facility was considered very valuable in the early stages of war against the Taliban and
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The United States then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
called Uzbekistan a “stalwart” partner. The friendship went on to become Strategic
Partnership in 2002 (Gealson, 2006, 52).

Figure 5. Uzbekistan, Karshi-Khanabad airbase Source: BBC

However, the United States’ approach to this partnership was based on
encouraging Uzbekistan to bring about reforms in governance, human rights, and
freedom of expression and holding free elections. Uzbekistan, in contrast, perceived these
conditions as a way to interfere in its internal affairs. The State Department’s evaluation
in July 2004 showed that Uzbekistan was not fulfilling her commitments under the 2002
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Strategic Partnership (Gealson, 2006, 57). The United States liberal approach towards
this strategic partnership was the last thing the Uzbek authoritarian president would
accept. Thus, disagreement on how to interpret the strategic partnership gave Russia an
opportunity to fill the expanding vacuum.
Another incident which ruined the strategic partnership and encouraged
Uzbekistan to expel American forces out of Karshi-Khanabad airbase was stance the
Americans and Europeans took on the Andijan massacre. In May 2005, Uzbek military
forces cracked down on armed opposition killing hundreds of people in Andijan, a city in
the Northeast of the country. The United States joined the European Union and
international organizations demanding an independent inquiry about the crackdown.
President Karimov rejected any independent inquiry proposed by the U.S. and Europe
calling it foreign interference. Instead, he created a commission of eight countries
including China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz republic, Pakistan, Russia, and
Tajikistan (Starr, 2005, 7). As a result, Uzbekistan changed its position on the KarshiKhanabad airbase and expelled the American forces out of the country in 2005 (Idan and
Shaffer, 262). Uzbekistan didn’t end its strategic partnership with the United States which
was started weeks after the 9/11 attacks, however, it has increased the level of security
cooperation with Russia (Gleason, 2006, 49). This rapid change in Uzbekistan’s foreign
policy becomes understandable when American liberal foreign policy approach towards
Uzbekistan and the Russian pressure on the country is taken into account.
Meanwhile, Russia did not show negative impulses against American Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in the first stages, and even cooperated to the certain
extent. Nonetheless, in 2003, Russia announced that American troops should leave former
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Soviet republics after the completion of their mission in Afghanistan. At the same time,
Russia increased its security and economic partnerships with Central Asian countries
including Uzbekistan. Russia was encouraging Central Asian countries to provide their
military airbases for Russian troops (Gleason, 2006, 52).
In May 2005, Uzbekistan withdrew from GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), an organization which was perceived by Moscow
as an anti-Russian body, regional security cooperation organization. The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in July said that the Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan -American and the Coalition forces operation against the Taliban and AlQaeda- had succeeded and thus all American troops should withdraw from their bases in
Central Asia. Under these circumstances, Uzbekistan framed the decision to expel
American troops as a Central Asian consensus. However, it was only Uzbekistan who
expelled American troops while Kyrgyz Republic didn’t concede with the SCO’s
decision (Gleason, 2006, 49-50). Nevertheless, Uzbekistan did not completely end her
partnership with the United States and continues to receive military aids from U.S. For
instance, in 2015, Uzbekistan received hundreds of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles from the Department of Defense. In June 2014, Pentagon said that, “As
the U.S. military footprint decreases in Afghanistan, regional partners, such as Pakistan
and Uzbekistan, will take on increasing responsibility for preventing al Qaeda from
reconstituting its safe haven and operational base in South and Central Asia, but also to
counter terrorist groups that pose a threat to regional stability” (United States Department
of Defense, June, 2014, 8). This example illustrates on Uzbekistan’s complicated multivictor foreign policy.
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Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is the second most important country in Uzbekistan’s
foreign policy. Kazakhstan is the only transit way which Uzbekistan’s exports go to
Russia and then to Europe. Thus, Uzbekistan shows concession and a special foreign
policy approach to making sure that the relations with that country remain cordial. For
instance, despite five hundred disputed locations on the Uzbek-Kazakh border,
Uzbekistan has shown the desire to solve the problem and after presidential-level
negotiations a delimitation process to solve the conflict began. This is in sharp contrast to
Uzbekistan's attitude towards its borders with other neighbors (Idan and Shaffer, 2011,
262).
In the first years of independence, Uzbekistan tried to diminish its cultural,
security, and economic dependence of the country on Russia and the inheritance of the
Soviet Union. President Islam Karimov sought to increase his foreign policy options by
attempting to strengthen ties with countries outside the former Soviet Union umbrella.
Karimov was pursuing the most independent foreign policy from Russia, compared to his
other Central Asian counterparts. Indeed, even when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan and
the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an Uzbek affiliate of Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, posed an extending threat against the country's security, Uzbekistan refused to
accept Russian offers to secure borders with Afghanistan by setting Russian troops in
Uzbekistan (Gealson, 2006, 55). The fact that Uzbekistan accepted to cooperate with the
United States in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan was another example that
Uzbekistan wanted to counterbalance Russian influence by seeking ties with the United
States. However, the geopolitical realities of the region and being doubly landlocked
deprived Uzbekistan from the luxury to follow an independent foreign policy.
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In addition, the instability in Uzbekistan’s neighboring countries, namely
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, was another factor which made Uzbekistan more dependent
on Russian transit through Kazakhstan. If the region was stable and Afghanistan could
provide security and transit facility from her border to with Uzbekistan in the North to
Pakistan’s border in the South, Uzbekistan could have one more vital transportation
route. This route is closer to the sea and eventually less costly compared to the current
Russian routes. As Chowdhury and Erdenebileg (2006, 24) document, the closest port to
Uzbekistan’s capital city is located 4300km away. According to Uzbekistan’s ministry of
Foreign Affairs website, stability in Afghanistan is a priority for Uzbekistan:
“As a result, of the counter-terrorism campaign led by the U.S. threats to Central
Asian security coming from this region have largely decreased. A positive tendency
towards stability in Central Asia can be observed. Taking the side of new Afghan leader
Hamid Karzai, Uzbekistan will further help Afghan people in their return to peaceful
existence. Inviting Afghanistan to the
Central Asian Cooperation Organization we were trying to involve this
indispensable part of Central Asia into regional processes. This will have its positive
effects on post-conflict rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Trans-afghan route is one of the
most prospective projects leading to sea communications of India” (Objectives of
Uzbekistan's foreign policy course, 2010, 3).
Conclusion. Uzbekistan is the most populated country in Central Asia and none
of its neighbors are considered a major regional power. Based on the World Bank
classifications no country in the region is categorized as a rich economy. Only
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are upper-middle income economies while Tajikistan and
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Kyrgyz republic are classified as lower-middle income. Afghanistan, another immediate
neighbor, is a low-income economy (The World Bank,2016). Thus, Uzbekistan is not
much influenced by the intra-regional power struggle. However, the country is affected
by extra-regional major powers’ rivalries over influence in the region and instability in
the neighborhood. Therefore, instability and poverty of the region directly affect
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. This tendency is visibly in its concession towards
Kazakhstan and lack of certainty to bandwagon with other powers rather than Russia.
Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to be the dominant
military and economic power in Central Asia. Hence, Uzbekistan, Unlike Armenia, is not
much influenced by intra-regional power dynamics. Uzbekistan’s security and foreign
policies are more affected by two main factors: First, the fact that country is doubly
landlocked and doesn’t have any other viable transportation route to the sea besides the
Kazakhstan-Russia transit way. Second, instability in Afghanistan does not allow
Uzbekistan to access the Pakistani ports which are much closer to Tashkent and
consequently could be much cheaper compared to the Russian ports.
Therefore, mentioned two factors have played determining role in
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy options and security alignments. Although it has several
times attempted to alter its foreign policy towards the West, especially vis-à-vis the
United States, and distance itself from Russian security and foreign policy sphere, such
endeavors have proved time and again to be short lived. Nevertheless, this approach has
helped Uzbekistan to maintain a multi-vector foreign policy. Nonetheless, at the end,
geopolitical factors of its location, poverty and instability of the region, limit the
foreign/security policy options this landlocked country has got.
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b. Afghanistan
Afghanistan is located in between South and Central Asia and historically referred
to as the heart of Asia (Tadjbakhsh, 2012, v). It is a landlocked country with three
maritime neighbors: China in the far Northeast, Pakistan in the South, and Iran in the
West. Its domestic underdevelopment and instability is intensified by the regional poverty
and increasing insecurity. Besides poverty and instability, Afghanistan is positioned at the
heart of regional and international rivalries between Pakistan and India, Iran and Saudi
Arabia, the United States and Russia and China. Within the framework of this thesis,
Afghanistan lays in a poor and unstable region.
The major conflicts in the region are the militant Taliban insurgency in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India, and the
Islamic militant insurgency in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Afghanistan’s foreign/security policies are directly affected by instability and poverty in
the region. Dual vulnerability is visible in Afghanistan’s case more than any other cases
studied in this thesis.
Underdevelopment and lack of access to the sea. Afghanistan is among the
poorest countries of the world with 31.63 million population and $20.04 billion GDP size
and it has a 35.8 percent poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines. The country’s
GNI per capita was $680 in 2014, among the lowest in the world (The World Bank,
Country Overview, 2016). Afghanistan’s larges import partners are Pakistan 33.03
percent, India 28.04 percent, Ira 5.85 percent, and Germany 2.99 percent (The World
Integrated Trade Solution, 2016) CIA’s figures from 2014 mention Russia responsible for
13 percent of Afghanistan imports, the Unites States for 10.7 percent, India 6.1 percent,

73

China 5.4 percent, Turkmenistan 4.8 percent, Kazakhstan 4.6 percent (CIA World
Factbook, 2014). Its export partners are Iran 19.45 percent, Pakistan 17.25 percent, China
13.49 percent, Japan 3.36 percent (The World Integrated Trade Solution, 2016). Again,
CIA World Factbook indicates the United States and Tajikistan among Afghanistan’s
largest export partners with 8.7 and 7.1 percent respectively (CIA World Factbook, 2014).
Afghanistan not only lacks access to the sea, it also lacks modern major
transportation network with no railroads and no navigable rivers. Thus logisticians were
one of major barriers for the Soviets during the 1980s and still is the challenge for the
U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (Rya, 2009, 4). In the Soviet case, distance and
limited transportation facilities were the greater challenge. The U.S. and NATO forces,
besides those two obstacles, use the main road between Kabul and Khyber Pass located at
the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan in the east (Ryan, 2009, 4). However, the enmity
in the relations of Afghanistan with Pakistan and insecure routes double the challenge
As mentioned it has three maritime neighbors, however, using Chinese routes is
not feasible due to the unfriendly terrain and distance. Country’s routes connection to the
Iranian ports is just recently developed and still under construction. Moreover, Iranian
ports are understood to be underdeveloped and far from the economic and political
capital of the country, Kabul. In this situation, Pakistani ports seems to be the closest and
most efficient window for Afghanistan to access international markets. However,
underdevelopment of Iranian path and hostility in relations with Pakistan pushed
Afghanistan to indulge its historic neutrality and go under the spheres of influence of the
Soviet Union in during the Cold War.
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Afghanistan's trade flows through these four main transit corridors: Central Asian
countries (through Hairatan, Sherkhan Bandar, and Turghundi in the North and Northwest
to connect to the former Soviet railways to access their western, northern and eastern
seaports; the Persian Gulf through Iranian Bandar Abbas, Bandar Khomeini, and
Khoramshahr ports; to Europe passing overland Iran and Turkey; and finally Pakistani
seaports in Karachi and Gwardar utilizing Pakistani railways from Khyber Pass and
border point of Chaman (Chowdhury and Erdenebileg, 2006, 90-91).
The transportation goods need to travel 1,250 miles from Pakistani seaports to
reach Kabul taking 5 to 14 days. The second ground route from Pakistani seaports to
Kandahar, the regional hub in the southern Afghanistan, is 570 miles long and usually
takes 5 to 7 days (Ryan, 2009, 12). Attacks by the Taliban and other insurgent groups
worsen the conditions and in some instances besides setting in fire the cargos they cause
border closure for weeks and even months.
For most of the countries studied in this thesis, including Afghanistan, access to
the seaports and international transportation routes build the corn-stone of their foreign
policy. There was a time in the modern Afghanistan history when ruler Amir Abdurahman
Khan proclaimed that "as long as Afghanistan has not arms enough to fight against any
great attacking power, it would be folly to allow railways to be laid throughout the
country" (Chowdhury and Erdenebileg, 2006, 92). This decision, which was based on
Amir's Abdurahman's fear that the British India or Russia will undermine his power if the
landlocked and mountainous country was more accessible through railways and modern
transportation system. This decision was made in a time when Britain and Russia were
building railways in Indian subcontinent and Central Asia. Afghanistan. after more than a
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century, still is does not have the railways to put its trade on track. Not Afghanistan itself
is affected by its domestic underdevelopment but also the neighboring countries,
especially Central Asian ones.
Security Challenges. Afghanistan’s security challenges are fighting the Islamic
extremist groups such as the Taliban, Haqani Network, al-Qaeda, and the recently ISIL.
The first three mainly operate from Pakistan and enjoy safe heavens there. The last 15
years have not been an exception of insurgents using Pakistani soil to fight against
Afghanistan’s central government.
In the period of 1954 and 1963, the Soviet Union paid $515 million as foreign aid
to Afghanistan and the United States supplied $178 million for the same period.
Moreover, the Soviet Union provide almost three quarter of Afghanistan's foreign
exchange needs (Hasan, 1964, 52). These figures explain how the Soviet Union won the
good well of people and India is using a similar technique. Thus, Afghanistan foreign
policy was shaped by its geographic handicap and the need for foreign aid.
This challenge roots back to the 1975 when a group of Islamists planned a
military uprising against President Mohammed Daoud who came to power in 1973 as a
consequence of a pro-Soviet military republican coup (Saikal, 2004, 14). Those militants
sought refuge in Pakistan to rebel against the communist regime and the Soviet Union
military invasion of the country in after a second military coup in 1978. Pakistan has
continued to provide refuge and sanctuaries to the rebels fighting against Afghanistan’s
central government for more than four decades now. The reasons behind this hostility to
be discussed later.
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Foreign policy (Between being buffer state and neutral). Neutrality and a
demand for access to the sea have been two principle features of Afghanistan’s foreign
policy. The first was a continuation of the role it played as a buffer state during the 19th
century (Andisha, 2015, 1) between Russia and British India and the second has been
based on a historical land dispute rooted in the mentioned rivalry between Russia and
British India. Eventually, the desire to access the sea altered Afghanistan’s so called
neutrality entering the country in a phase of non-ending conflicts.
Understanding current conflicts in Afghanistan and the features of its foreign
policy require a brief look in the country’s history. Afghanistan's history in the whole
19th century and the first part of 20th century was determined by the growing rivalries
between British India in the south and Tsarist Russian and then the Soviet Union in the
north. Russians advancement in Central Asia, which started in the second half of 19th
century, reached the Amu Darya (which is historically known as Oxus) by 1869
(Glassner, 1971, 49). From 1830s to 1870s Tsarist Russia occupied most parts of Central
Asia getting closer to the British sphere of power in South Asia. According to an 1873
agreement between Russia and British India, Britain accepted Russian expansions in
Central Asia as legitimate and in reverse Russia stated that Afghanistan lay outside its
zone of interest (Saikal, 2004, 29). Thus, it was agreed that Afghanistan will remain as
buffer state between two empires.
Russian adventures in Central Asia coincident with the demise of Amir Dost
Mohammad Khan and chaos amongst his offspring on the crown. Dost Mohammad
remained loyal to the British after being reinstalled to power in the aftermath of the first
war between Afghanistan and Britain in 1841. After Dost Mohammad’s death, Russians
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sent a delegation to the Kabul to discuss further advancement towards India. British
India, worried about Russian increasing influence, invaded Afghanistan in 1878 capturing
the major cities and installing a new ruler: Amir Abdurrahman Khan in 1881.
Abdurrahman was the grandson of Dost Mohammad. Abdurrahman used iron feast and
blood shedding to offset his opponents. Nonetheless, he was able to stabilize the troubled
country and in 1893 agreed on a borderline with the British India (Glassner, 1971, 48)
which later became known as the Durand Line and the base of hostility in relations with
Pakistan since 1947.
Based on the same agreement, Afghanistan lost its sovereignty over its foreign
affairs until the country’s independence in 1919. The country became the buffer state to
separate the spheres of influences of British India and Russia (Glassner, 1971, 49). After
independence, Afghanistan altered its buffer role to proclaim neutrality.
Although some scholars (Andisha, 2015 and Cronin, 2013) have dispute over the
nature and the circumstances under which Afghanistan's neutrality was formed and
shaped, they agree that neutrality has been an important pillar in the country's foreign
policy since independence in 1919. The first argues that Afghanistan’s neutrality was a
continuation of the externally imposed buffer role and the country never had a full
neutrality as the term is defined in international law. Thus Afghanistan’s neutrality was
implemented only during the international wars like the World War II. Therefore,
neutrality in the future cannot be a good option for the country while it does not have
enough military strength and political cohesion (Andisha, 2015, 6).
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Cronin, on the contrary argues that Afghanistan, like Switzerland, is one of best
candidates for neutrality due to its “challenging topography, dislike of outsiders, and
widespread warrior traditions…” (Cronin, 2013, 61).
To explain how neutrality could bring stability to Afghanistan and satisfy all
neighboring countries and major powers in the region, Cronin believes that neutrality will
guarantee regional balance of power over Afghanistan which has been the trouble hub of
the region for more than three decades now. For instance, Russia was one of the first
powers which accepted Afghanistan as a buffer state and even after invading the country
in 1979, in 1985 Russia proposed neutrality of Afghanistan as a precursor for its troops
withdrawal, which was rejected by the United States. Now, it is in Russian interest to see
American forces withdrawal leave behind a neutral Afghanistan.
Similarly, Iran is eager to see American troops out of Afghanistan. At the same
time, however, it is concerned with the re-installment of pro-Saudi Sunni extremist
groups such as the Taliban on the power in Afghanistan. India is worried about the return
of the Taliban to the power and presumably fall of Afghanistan back in the hands of
Pakistan. Conversely, Pakistan has always shown anxiety about Indian influence in
Afghanistan and as discussed, this concern has been in the core of Pakistan’s hostile
policy towards Afghanistan. Thus, the only way to balance all these conflicting regional
and international interests and bring stability to the country is Afghanistan’s neutrality
with regional and international guarantees (Cronin, 2013 67).
Since the Independence "Afghanistan's traditional policy is the safeguarding of its
national independence through non-alignment, friendship, and cooperation with all
countries" and Afghanistan will continue to support the demand for Pashtunistan" (Dr.
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Yusuf Policy statement, 1963). Hasan (1964) believes that these principles in
Afghanistan's foreign policy are derived from the country's geopolitics, economic needs,
racial structure (Hasan, 1964, 48). During the Cold War, while Iran and Pakistan were
members of Cento and close allies to the United States, Afghanistan remained nonaligned as barrier between the Soviet Union in its north and Pakistan in its south (Hasan,
1964, 48). A policy to be altered later by growing hostility with Pakistan over the historic
land dispute.
Neutrality was the core principle of Afghanistan's foreign policy through World
War II. However, after the partition of the subcontinent, Afghanistan demanded selfdetermination for the Pashtuns on the Indian side of the Durand Line who were under the
reign of British India according to the 1983 agreement (Glassner, 1971, 51). The
campaign for self-determination of Pashtuns on the Indian side of line was contested
inside Afghanistan on the ethnicity bases. Nonetheless, this demand reflected the desire
of this landlocked country to get access to the sea.
In this period, transportation was prioritized for Afghanistan as a national security
issue and on the top of foreign policy agendas. Afghanistan, constrained by the desire to
regain the lost territories and get access to the sea, leaned towards the Soviet Union
losing its historical neutrality.
The second peril of Afghanistan’s foreign policy has been a historic demand for
self-determination of Pashtun ethnics in the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.
Afghanistan was the only nation in the world which refused to vote for Pakistan’s
membership in the United Nations in September 1947 and demanded self-determination
for Pashtuns on the Pakistani side of Durand Line (Hussain, 1984, 500). This attitude
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caused a perpetual hostility in the relation between this landlocked country and its closest
maritime neighbor, Pakistan.
Pakistan rebuffed the idea to give autonomy or sovereignty to the Pashtuns
residing in the newly independent country. Furthermore, in reaction to Afghanistan’s
pressure for the cause, Pakistan started using its transit route as a leverage against
Afghanistan, delaying transport in transit and limiting its neighbor’s access to Karachi
seaport.
Afghanistan asked the United States for military assistance and support for its
territorial claims against Pakistan. When Truman and Eisenhower administrations
rejected Afghanistan’s proposal and soled arms to Pakistan, Afghanistan turned to the
Soviet Union which was ready to provide military assistance and support for the
territorial claims against Pakistan (Chalk and Hanauer, 2012, 41).
Again, due to the hostile relations with Pakistan and the repeated blockade
imposed on Afghanistan's transits through Karachi Port, Afghanistan appealed to the
United States to build the Chabahar port in the Iranian coast of the Arab Sea for
Afghanistan's use. This idea was rejected by the United states and Iran calling it
economically impractical. On the contrary, the Soviet Union, in 1954, accepted to provide
Afghanistan with the USSR transit facilities and increased its aid to Afghanistan
(Glassner, 1971, 54).
Eventually, the need for access to the sea while it had an antagonistic relation with
Pakistan and Iranian routes were underdeveloped, pushed Afghanistan towards the Soviet
Union. It was a historic shift in Afghanistan’s foreign policy mainly because this change
shaped the country’s fate in the following decades.
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Some scholars have interpreted this policy as a demand to have easier access to
the sea, however, some others believe that it was more a personal lure for the Afghanistan
ruling family, who were known as Peshawar Sardars (O. Caroe, 1958, 435) referring to
fact that their great-grand father ruled Peshawar in the 19th century. Another objective of
the ruling family was to bring more Pashtu speakers under their rule to alter the balance
of ethnic groups in Afghanistan in the favor of Pashtuns (Hasan, 1964, 56). Afghanistan
didn’t dispute on its northern borders with the Soviet Union and later with the Central
Asian republics which similar to Pakistan have inherited lands, historically belonged to
Afghanistan, from a former colonial power (Saikal, 2004, 29). The counterargument to
that is that those lands do not bring Afghanistan any closer to the sea, in contrast, lands
beyond Durand Line does. However, this is an example of how an internally disputed
interest is translated as the interests of the state by securitizing an issue which
consequently has affected foreign policy.
Securitization of border disputes and transforming it to a threat to national
security is one of the characteristics of weak states who suffer internal violence and face
low degree of socio-political cohesion. Weak states use the nationalistic impulses to
securitize disputed issues with the neighboring countries (Rohers, 2005, 21-24). This
tendency in the foreign policy is visible the cases of Afghanistan, Armenia, and Bolivia.
It is difficult to distinguish between national security and the ruling party’s
interest in the weak states. Thus, the ruling group or party may securitize its interest as
the national security. In such cases, national security is devolved into regime security
defending the interests of the ruling elite (Girgosian, 2006, 225), complicating the states’

82

orientation in the international system which could invite regional or international
conflicts into the country (Rohers, 2005, 26).
The Pashtunistan issue and Afghanistan’s campaign to promote self-determination
for Pashtuns on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line resembles Bolivia’s attitude
towards Chile. Both countries show high level of frustrations by historical disputes
towards their closest maritime neighbors. On the contrast to the existing literature, these
two landlocked countries show no concession in their foreign policy towards their main
transit neighbors. Thus, other factors like nationalisms can explain their exceptional
behaviors.
Between Pakistan and India. India and Pakistan, two important actors in South
Asia, have incompatible interests in Afghanistan which have complicated security and
stability of Afghanistan and the region. Afghanistan is central to the Indian goals which
seek to eliminate the safe havens of terrorist groups inside Pakistan, project power in
South Asia, and getting access to markets and natural resources in Central Asia.
Conversely, Pakistan’s goals in Afghanistan are mainly India-centric and concentrated on
countering Indian influence in Afghanistan. Hence, a fragile government which is
subjugated by the Taliban, or under their influence, will help Pakistan to subdue Indian
projecting power in South Asia, and undermine India's capability to support Baloch
separatists in Pakistan (Chalk and Hanauer, 2012, ix). Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s
former president, in an interview for Tolo News, told me that Pakistan has mainly two
demands from Afghanistan. First, it wants Afghanistan to recognize the Durand line, and
second, to cut its friendship with India (Black and White, Tolo News, August, 2015).
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Therefore, countering Indian influence in Afghanistan, besides the historical
dispute over the Durand, construct the main area of conflict between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. It is not likely that Afghanistan will see peace unless Pakistani policy
makers prioritize stability in Afghanistan over countering India (Rashid and Rubin, 2008,
6). From this perspective, Afghanistan’s interests converge with those of India to tackle
terrorism in the region and contain Pakistan. However, despite heavy Indian economic
investment and its growing influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been capable to
undermine these efforts and to continue the chaos.
Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership with India in 2011. In order to not
antagonize Pakistan, the third article of the Agreement on Strategic Partnership Between
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India states that: "The Strategic
Partnership between the Sides is not directed against any other state or group of states".
However, one of the areas that both countries will cooperate is stated in the b section in
the Political and Security Cooperation part as: “Support for the reform and expansion of
the United Nations Security Council, including a permanent seat for India in the Council”
(AFG-Indo Strategic Partnership Agreement, 2011). This article looks like enough
provocation for Pakistan to be cynical about growing cooperation between India and
Afghanistan.
Transportation is one of core areas the strategic partnership with India is focused
on. This agreement insists of transforming Afghanistan into the energy and transportation
hub connecting Central and South Asia (Afg-Indo Strategic Partnership Agreement,
2011).
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United States' military dependency on the Pakistani routes to supply goods for the
battle grounds in Afghanistan, besides Pakistan's assumed role in the fight against the
Taliban and Al-Qaida, is a major factor in the U.S. reluctance to pressure Pakistan. As
Chalk and Hanauer (2012) argue, the United States gave out over $16 billion in military
aids to Pakistan between 2002 and 2011. However, Pakistan has supported terrorist
groups which are fighting the U.S. and its allies’ forces since the overthrow of the Taliban
regime in 2002.
To stress on the importance of American dependency on the Pakistani
transportation routes, Chalk and Hanauer argue that when the number of the U.S and
NATO forces declines in Afghanistan, United States will be less dependent on Pakistan
and thus more inclined to pressure Pakistan (Chalk and Hanauer, 2012, 3). Thus it is
visible that access to the sea is a determining factor not only for Afghanistan’s foreign
policy, but also for a super-power which needs to get into this landlocked country via
Pakistan
An illustration of this problem was more visible after a Pakistani border post was
mistakenly attacked by American air force, in November 2011 and, in reaction, Pakistan
closed its routes to American and NATO supplies for several months. To fine alternate
supply route, the United states signed a deal with Russia and several Central Asian
countries to use their soil for military deliveries (Chalk and Hanauer, 2012, 5). Ironically,
this resembled the same remedy that Afghanistan tried in 1950s and 1960s when facing
blockade by Pakistan. This fact is a reminder that the very nature of Afghanistan’s
problem is not changed over half a century. A guaranteed access to the sea is still vital for
the country and that need shapes the country’s foreign policy and alignment.
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Figure 6. The U.S. and NATO supply routes Source: U.S. TRANSCOM

Besides Pakistan's Indo-phobia, there are two other objectives which Pakistan
pursue in Afghanistan and are related to the historic land dispute between Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The first, as Chalk and Hanauer mention, is a fear that a stronger
Afghanistan may strengthen the "Pashtunistan" and Balochistan separatist movements.
And the second is related to Afghanistan's neglect on recognizing the Durand Line as
international boundary between these two countries (Chalk and Hanauer, 2012, 2).
Afghanistan's government has used the competition between India and Pakistan to
reduce the country's dependence on Pakistan route for trade with utilizing Indian
investments in building roads and transportation system. At the same time, to reduce
Pakistan's antagonism, President Karzai accepted Pakistani offers for training
Afghanistan's military officers and called Pakistan his nation's "twin brother" (Chalk and
Hanauer, 2012, 39). Calling Pakistan, created in 1947, the twin brother is ironic because
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President Karzai continuously claimed that his nation is more than five thousand years
old. These twin brothers were born several millennia apart from each other.
One can argue that Karzai’s government was successful in using Pakistan and
India against each other on the diplomatic an economic helm. Karzai’s attitude resembled
other Afghanistan rulers’ tendency to balance between the British empire and then the
United State on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. However, this game was not
effective to bring peace and security when it was over-played by Premier and then
President Daoud and is proved to be ineffective during Karzai’s era. The rivalry between
India and Pakistan deteriorated the security and rule of law in Afghanistan.
Chabahar vs. Gwadar. The idea of encirclement is leads the politics of the region.
Pakistan is encircled by India, on the return, India feels increasingly encircled by China,
especially by Sino-Pakistani strategic alignment, and China is threatened by the United
States-India-Japan trio in the region. American military presence in Afghanistan has
intensified this feeling among Chinese policy makers (Daniels, 2013, 94). Afghanistan,
similar to the 19th and 20th centuries, is located in the middle of these rivalries and
influenced by the incompatible projects.
Therefore, the competing strategic projects of Chabahar, in Iran, and Gwadar, in
Pakistan, are reflections of the growing geopolitical competition between Iran-India and
China-Pakistan camps in the South Asia. These two projects aim to provide independent
and reliable routes for India and China to get access to the resources of Central Asia
(Daniels, 2013, 93). At the same time, Chabahar and Gwadar ports have the potential to
be used for military purposes if tensions increase between India and China.
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India in cooperation with Iran built the much waited highway linking Afghanistan
major cities to the Chabahar port on the Persian Gulf. This route, which the United States
refused to build in 1950s, may eliminate Afghanistan's dependence on the Pakistani
routes to access the sea (Rashid and Rubin, 2008, 5).
Pakistan has built Gwadar port, with Chinese economic support, to facilitate trade
with Central Asia through Afghanistan. This port also aims to limit Indian access to the
Central Asian markets and energy resources, a goal shared with China. At the same time,
it provides Central Asian Republics an alternative to the Iranian routes (Chalk and
Hanauer, 2012, 31).
Chabahar provides Afghanistan with a less costly route, compared to the Central
Asia-Russia route, to
the seas and enables it
to counterbalance
Pakistan’s leverage
and lessen the
countries dependent
on the Pakistani ports.
Chabahar also can

Figure 7. Chabahar route

increase Afghanistan’s negligence to show concession in foreign policy regarding
Pakistan.
Central Asia is important for both India and Pakistan due to their increasing need
for energy and. The proposed $7.7 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
(TAPI) pipeline would provide India and Pakistan with 14 billion cubic meters’ gas per
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year (bcm/y). India, besides its need for Central Asian energy, wants to balance Chinese
influence on Central Asian Republics (Chalk and Hanauer, 2012, 12), part of a strategic
ambition to challenge China in South and Central Asia.
India has invested more than $2 billion in Afghanistan's development projects
such as infrastructures, agriculture, telecommunication, electricity power, and roads.
India is the fifth largest foreign donor since 2001 which has helped India to build a
friendly image for itself among ordinary people in Afghanistan and enjoy "soft-power"
(Chalk and Hanauer, 2012, 16).
Conclusion. One can conclude that Afghanistan has practiced multi-vector
foreign policy, a characteristic to landlocked countries, in most parts of its last one and
half century history. Afghanistan has been able to keep its relations cordial with
competing forces such as the United States, Iran, Russia, China and India. The
complexity of this situation becomes more visible taking into account the presence of
thousands of American soldiers in Afghanistan.
in the aftermath of the Indian subcontinent partition, because of the insecure
relations with Pakistan and underdevelopment of the Iranian routes, Afghanistan didn’t
have other choice but to lean towards the Soviet Union. That stance altered Afghanistan’s
foreign policy and security measures like never before. Afghanistan, with a desire to get
access to the sea using the Soviet Union military and economic power against Pakistan,
got trapped in proxy wars and unending rivalries between major regional and
international powers.
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. and NATO military campaign
against terrorists, India is playing a role like that of the Cold War Soviet Union in
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Afghanistan. but of course a less masculine one, to counterbalance Pakistan. However,
Afghanistan’s efforts to use these powers in its own benefit did not pay off very much
and as a playground for the competing powers, remains unsafe and still with no
guaranteed access to the sea.
furthermore, Afghanistan has not been able to change the rules of the zero-sum
game with Pakistan, arguably the most important and vicious stakeholder. Thus, despite
the presence of thousands of U.S. and NATO forces, the country is still bleeding from
insecurity and growing geopolitical rivalries in the region which disables the government
to provide security and economic prosperity for the population.
Afghanistan, prone to dual-vulnerability, suffers not only from domestic
instability and underdevelopment, but also is surrounded, mostly, by underdeveloped
neighbors and instable neighborhood. Afghanistan’s location in the middle of regional
competitions and its terrain bears a resemblance to the 17th century Switzerland. The role
of a provocative nationalism and historic disputes in its foreign policy towards its closest
maritime neighbor is similar to that of Bolivia and Armenia. However, unlike Bolivia, it
lacks a developed natural resources industry. Underdevelopment and instability in the
region is similar to Uzbekistan and Botswana. But the nature of its export products is not
like that of Botswana and is constrained to have a cordial relation with the neighborhood
or to suffer from perpetual poverty and violence.
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PART IV
CONCLUSION
A. Introduction
This thesis was set out to explore the impact of regional factors of wealth and
stability on the foreign policies and security measures of landlocked states. Looking at
this question is important because there are 42 landlocked states in the world and most of
them suffer from poverty and instability. About half of all low-income economies in the
world are landlocked states. And most importantly, there is a correlation between
insecurity and lack of development which most landlocked states suffer from.
Internal instability and domestic underdevelopment of landlocked states are
intensified by lack of stability and poverty in the region. Because landlocked states are
limited by their surrounding geography, and have to use the land of neighboring
sovereign states to access international markets, which puts them in inferior power
position compared to their maritime neighbors. In some of the case studies presented in
this thesis, the instability of landlocked states is not contained within their borders. In
fact, the surrounding region and beyond are effected, eventually, creating instability on
regional and international levels. However, the existing body of literature about the
matter does not give much focus on this issues.
this thesis assumes that the geographical situation and regional context of each
landlocked country have different effects over its foreign policy and security.
Accordingly, in its attempt to answer the initial research questions about the effects of
regional contexts, the thesis uses a 2/2 theoretical framework which divides regions
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where landlocked countries are located in four categories: Stable and wealthy, stable but
poor regions, wealthy but instable, and finally poor and instable regions.
Six landlocked countries were chosen as case studies for the above four
categories. Switzerland, Bolivia. Botswana, Armenia, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Their
foreign policy papers, statements of leaders, scholarly books and articles, and finally facts
and figures presented by international organizations were assessed to find answer for the
research question stated earlier. Inductive reasoning was used to draw the final
conclusion comparing all cases studied in this thesis.
B. Empirical findings
Location matters the most. Stability and wealth of the region have direct impact
on the security and foreign policies of landlocked states. Thus, the understanding of the
location of landlocked countries and their regional context proves very crucial to
comprehend its current internal situation and introduce policy changes or interventions.
For instance, in the cases of Switzerland and Afghanistan, both countries are landlocked
and share a somehow similar history of lack of domestic cohesion, regional tensions, and
difficult topography. While Switzerland managed to grow one of three highest GDP per
capita internationally, Afghanistan is still one of the poorest countries in the world. If
only landlocked status was the determining factor, both countries should have similar
economic conditions. The difference between the countries, however, is apparent in their
locations and the level of wealth and stability their respective regions enjoy. This
suggests that if Switzerland was located in a poor and instable region, we canassume that
it would have been experiencing similar conditions as Afghanistan today.
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The study of the six different case studies from five different regions of the world
led, through this thesis, to assess how the two independent regional variables: wealth and
stability, affect the two dependent variables: security and foreign policy.
Poor and unstable regions (Uzbekistan and Afghanistan). If a landlocked country
is located in a poor and unstable region, its foreign policy and security are directly
affected by those regional factors. The country’s economic prosperity and internal
security are affected by its landlocked status and, therefore, it experiences dualvulnerability. Some landlocked states in such regions show concession towards their
maritime or transit neighbors and are more likely to experience underdevelopment and
insecurity. Some others, due to nationalism, may not show the same level of concession.
Uzbekistan is an example of a country which shows concession towards its main transit
neighbor, Kazakhstan. And Afghanistan, on the contrary, does not show concession
towards its closest maritime neighbor, Pakistan. Thus, Access to the sea and
transportation issues are securitized as national priorities in this category of landlocked
states.
Poor but stable regions (Bolivia and Botswana). If a country is located in a poor
but stable region, poverty, and weak infrastructure of the region affect the wellbeing of
the landlocked country and hence its foreign policy. Landlocked countries located in this
type of region are less likely to experience insecurity. Thus, economy is the main concern
for these countries, not security. Such countries concern themselves more with
developing means of transportation and cross-country commerce routes to secure their
economic activities. They also concern more with their relationships with neighboring
countries to find means of transportation for their national exports. However, the nature
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of the country’s exports and domestic wealth may determine the trends of their foreign
policy and security measures.
For instance, Botswana uses air transportation for its rich diamond industry export
rather than overland transportation. Therefore, it is not much affected by
underdevelopment of its neighbors’ transportation systems and regional poverty. On the
other hand, Bolivia is affected by its own poor infrastructure and the tensions with its
closest neighbor, Chile. The nature of Bolivia’s main exports of oil and gas, forces it to
depend on overland transportation via its neighbors which makes its external relations a
matter of importance.
Rich but unstable regions (Armenia). Instability of the region is a fundamental
factor affecting foreign policy and security measures of landlocked states. Besides being
affected by the spillovers of instability in the region, the dual-vulnerability of landlocked
countries is more visible in such cases.
Rich and stable regions (Switzerland). Landlocked countries located in the
wealthy and stable regions are rare. They do not seem to share many characteristics with
landlocked countries located in the other three categories. They do not prioritize the
development of transportation issue and access to the sea as much as landlocked
countries in other regions. Mainly because their main export and import neighboring
partners are wealthy and stable. Nonetheless, history shows that being neighbors with big
powers, for instance in the case of Switzerland, effects the security and foreign policy of
the landlocked country. Moreover, it is effected by the changes in the balance of power in
the region and mighty neighbors may have plans to occupy or intervene in the landlocked
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country’s affairs. However, since its declaration as a neutral state, Switzerland has been
able to maintain its internal stability and sovereignty.
C. Theoretical implications
Findings of this thesis show that contrary to the existing literature (Idan and
Shaffer, 2001), some landlocked countries do not show concession in their foreign
policies towards their maritime neighbors and in contrast have antagonistic foreign
policies against them. Bolivia’s attitude regarding Chile, Armenia’s relations with
Turkey, and Afghanistan’s behavior towards Pakistan are examples of this pattern.
Aggression based on nationalism is at the core of this behavior. However, this factor is
not addressed in the literature concerning foreign policy and security of landlocked states.
A second factor which is widely forgotten in the literature on the foreign/security
policies of landlocked states is the influence the nature of export products on the foreign
policy trends or security measures of landlocked countries. Botswana’s case, for example,
shows that if the main product of a country does not need to be exported through
transportation systems of the neighboring countries, the landlocked country’s foreign and
security policies may not be much affected by its landlocked status or wealth and stability
of the region. To some extent, the same is true about Switzerland due to its service based
economy. In contrast, when a landlocked state’s main export is largely dependent on the
overland transit routes of its neighbors, such as Bolivia’s gas export or Uzbekistan’s
Catton, it is affected by the regional factors of poverty, underdevelopment, and instability
and, thus, needs to tone its foreign policy accordingly.
D. Policy Implications
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Case studies presented in this thesis show that the landlocked countries which
managed to stay away from regional and international wars or rivalries tend to be more
secure and less affected by conflicts in their regions. Switzerland’s permanent neutrality,
Botswana’s ad hoc neutrality during the liberty movement in the Southern Africa, and
Afghanistan’s neutrality during the two World Wars and then its non-alignment during
the first half of the Cold War, are examples of such foreign policy behaviors. Most
landlocked countries follow multi-vector foreign policies which enable them to keep the
balance between different influential actors. However, the overlay of this policy, such as
Afghanistan in 1950-60s, can invite regional and international conflicts into the country.
More investigation is still needed to see if neutrality can be the best foreign policy
option for landlocked states. Exiting literature (Cronin, 2013 and Andisha 2015) show
that neutrality might work in some but not all cases. For instance, neutrality paid off for
Switzerland but not for Austria. Although, the current argument (Cronin, 2013) is that
Switzerland had armed-neutrality and thus was successful. In contrast, Austria was
disarmed and neutralized by the foreign forces, hence, it was unsuccessful. Nevertheless,
it is not very clear if the kind of neutrality was behind Austria’s failure to prevent
Germany from invading it at the wake of World War II or it was other factors. Further
scholarship on this issue may prove helpful.
E. Limitations of the study
Scarcity of literature on the foreign policy and security of landlocked countries
proved very limiting for this thesis. Even when foreign policy or security of landlocked
countries are studied, it is not focused on the landlocked factor. The existing body of
scholarship on the landlocked countries is mainly concentrated on development and
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economy. Thus, most of the literature used in this thesis is extracted from studies which
are not resolute on the landlocked factor from security or foreign policy perspectives.
In addition to that limitation, there are two other factors which play significant
roles in determining a landlocked country’s relation with its neighborhood. Nationalism
and the main export product. Future research may discover more about these two factors
and their relation with landlocked status and how they influence the landlocked countries
shaping their foreign policies and security measures.
F. Conclusion
In contrast to the existing literature, which suggests that there are no direct
relations between being landlocked and security, findings of this thesis show that foreign
policy and security of landlocked countries are directly affected by the landlocked status
and two regional factors: wealth and stability. Wealth and stability of the regions are
decisive factors for foreign policy and security of landlocked states. These two factors,
with some exceptions, determine landlocked countries’ foreign policy options and their
security measures. The fact that those landlocked states, which are better off now, are
located in wealthy and stable regions and those which are struggling with instability and
underdevelopment are located in instable and poor regions reveals the importance of
region. Exceptional landlocked states, like Botswana, may run out of their natural
resources one day, but location doesn’t go anywhere.
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